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ARTICLE

Collaborative Departmentalism
MATTHEW STEILEN†

It is thus borne in upon one that the principle of departmental autonomy does not necessarily spell departmental conflict, but that mutual consultation and collaboration are quite
as logical deductions from it.
—Edward Corwin

INTRODUCTION
Presidential independence in matters of constitutional
interpretation is almost always controversial. Any hint of it
generates heat. In late March 2012, for instance, as the
country strained to read the tea leaves in the oral argument
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in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius1—the health care
case—it was reported that Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C.
Circuit had given the “thumbs up” to the suggestion that,
even if the law was upheld by the Supreme Court, a
Republican president could simply decline to enforce it
because the president believed the law unconstitutional.2 A
legal journalist reporting on Judge Kavanaugh’s comments
described the view as “bizarre.”3 In response, a prominent
academic wrote a letter to the editor, suggesting that the
journalist was unfamiliar with basic constitutional history. 4
Some cheered the letter,5 but others did not, and one week
later the academic sought to clarify his position.6
The exchange, the passion, and the variety of views are
all typical of this topic. A similar fusillade followed the
announcement by President Obama that the Department of
Justice would no longer defend the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), having concluded the law was unconstitutional.7
And, of course, all of this pales in comparison to the
collective hand-wringing over the constitutional views
announced by the Bush administration.8 So why is it that
independent presidential interpretation of the Constitution
1. No. 11-393, slip op.; oral argument, Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567
U.S.
__
,
132
S.
Ct.
2566
(2012),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-393.pdf.
2. See Jeffrey Toobin, Holding Court, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 2012, at 41.
3. Id.
4. See Michael Dorf, A Letter in Response to Jeffrey Toobin’s Article, NEW
YORKER, Apr. 9, 2012, at 3.
5. Jonathan H. Adler, Professor Dorf Takes Jeffrey Toobin Back to School,
THE
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Apr.
3,
2012,
3:48
PM),
www.volokh.com/2012/04/03/professor-dort-takes-jeffrey-toobin-back-to-school/.
6. Michael Dorf, Was I as Sloppy as Jeffrey Toobin?, DORF ON LAW (Apr. 11,
2012,
12:30
AM),
www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/04/was-i-as-sloppy-as-jefftoobin.html.
7. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The Incoherence of President Obama’s Stance
on Gay Marriage, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 10, 2012, 12:59 PM),
www.volokh.com/2012/05/10/the-incoherence-of-president-obamas-stance-ongay-marriage/.
8. See Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do? Interpreting the
Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395,
395-96 (2008).
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generates such controversy? Why isn’t it familiar and
comfortable for lawyers, despite its considerable historical
pedigree? One answer touches on presidential control. The
Constitution is supposed to control the president. If the
president can interpret it himself, how can it do this? Won’t
he just interpret the Constitution in a way that slacks
control, or even adds to his power?
The idea developed in this Article is that judicial
supremacy in matters of constitutional interpretation is
unnecessary for presidential control—and that it may be, in
fact, counterproductive. “Judicial supremacy” is the view
that the Supreme Court is the last and highest expositor of
constitutional meaning.9 As the Court put it in Cooper v.
Aaron, “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution.”10 The usual view is that judicial
supremacy is necessary for legal control of the political
branches. This is the view taken by the Court, which
recently described judicial supremacy in terms that
suggested it was necessary for constitutional governance.11
And, of course, there is something to be said for this view.
“Departmentalism”—the idea that each branch of the
federal government enjoys independent authority to
interpret the Constitution—is usually associated with
recalcitrance and resistance to the rule of law. Indeed, all
the major historical examples of departmentalism can be
made to fit this pattern. Thomas Jefferson, Andrew
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt are all
famous for their battles with the courts, and for their
assertions that they were ungoverned by certain judicial
pronouncements.12 As one political scientist put it, writing

9. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
10. Id.; see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (“‘[T]his Court [is
the] ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211 (1962))).
11. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529, 535-36 (1997).
12. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 28-81 (2007).

348

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

in the early 1970s, departmentalism is in effect a doctrine of
“executive supremacy.”13
Even defenders of departmentalism take this view. For
present purposes, we can think of defenders as dividing into
three camps: presidentialists, popular constitutionalists,
and critics of judicial supremacy. Each has its reasons for
endorsing
departmentalism.
Presidentialists
cast
departmentalism as essential to the leadership task of
transforming government to meet the problems of the day. 14
The strong president, they suggest, will find the theory
necessary to his effort to remake the constitutional regime.15
Popular constitutionalists argue that departmentalism
preserves the role of the people as the Constitution’s
ultimate expositor.16 The people’s views, they say, are better
reflected in the constitutional constructions of the political
branches, which departmentalism protects.17 Lastly, critics
of judicial supremacy endorse departmentalism to the
13. ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 16 (1971).
Scigliano intended the argument as a criticism; but proponents of
departmentalism and expansive presidential power make the same argument.
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 277-78 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch].
14. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 69-71, 96-99, 16869 (2008); DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 115-96 (2003);
WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 28-81; Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional
Construction
and
Departmentalism:
A
Case
Study
of
the
Demise of the Whig Presidency, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 425, 435-57 (2010); cf.
EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 69-84 (1938) (identifying presidential
assertions of departmentalism).
15. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 52.
16. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 3-8 (2004); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING
THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 6-32 (1999); see also Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1031-34 (2004) (discussing Kramer’s
scholarship).
17. See KRAMER, supra note 16, at 106-14, 201; cf. Neal Kumar Katyal,
Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1341, 1350-53
(2001) (defending congressional supremacy on the grounds that the legislature
better reflects the people’s views).
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extent that it entails abandoning the unilateral judicial
determination of constitutional meaning, a practice that is
undesirable for a variety of reasons.18 What unites these
camps is obviously a specific vision of government. That
vision emphasizes the importance of “constitutional
politics”—i.e., the significance of non-judicial action for
constitutional meaning—and limits the role of the federal
courts.19 The two parts of the vision are related, since the
struggle over constitutional meaning is assumed to be a
zero-sum game.20 In other words, according to its defenders,
departmentalism reduces the authority of the courts in

18. See, e.g., JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 96-152 (1984) (arguing that judicial supremacy is inconsistent with
the proper role of the court in constitutional democracy); SUSAN R. BURGESS,
CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION AND WAR POWERS
DEBATE 109-26 (1992) (arguing that departmentalism fosters respect among the
political branches for constitutional boundaries); ROBERT A. BURT, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 353-75 (1992) (arguing that judicial supremacy is
inconsistent with mutual respect in constitutional discourse); LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 231-74
(1988) (arguing that departmentalism and justiciability doctrines facilitate
interbranch dialogue about constitutional meaning); Neal Devins & Louis
Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 84
(1998) (arguing judicial exclusivity is undesirable); Barry Friedman, Dialogue
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 578 (1993) (suggesting that a need to
legitimize judicial review has misled scholarship); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall
Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL.
401, 401-02 (1986) (arguing that constitutional interpretation sometimes
requires non-judicial determination); cf. Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman,
Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 67, 82 (2000)
(“Because constitutional meaning is so wrapped up in broader questions of
governance, constitutional interpretation should be a shared endeavor among
(at the least) all the branches of the national, state, and local governments.”).
19. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 6-14; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 43, 43-45 (1993) (arguing departmentalism would lessen the authority of
the federal courts). For an implicit acknowledgement that presidentialists and
populists are allied on this issue, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361
(1997).
20. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 52 (“The president and the
judiciary compete over the same constitutional space, with the authority of
presidents to reconstruct the inherited order supplanting judicial authority to
settled disputed constitutional meaning.”).
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order to strengthen the hand of some other player—the
president, or the people, or the national legislature.
Yet, critics and defenders aside, there are reasons to
think the zero-sum logic is mistaken. My aim in this Article
is to substantiate these reasons. To that end, I argue that a
regime I call “moderate” departmentalism actually
enhances the ability of the federal courts to restrict the
exercise of presidential power. How could it possibly have
such an effect? The core reason involves a familiar set of
ideas about regulatory “governance,” applied in a new way. 21
Consider the following features of constitutional law.
Constitutional law is fundamental law. Unlike ordinary
law, which government enacts to restrain the people,
fundamental law is “created by the people to regulate and
restrain the government.”22 In this way, the president, as
the head of a branch of government, is a stakeholder in the
determination of constitutional meaning. His policies and
the limits of his authority are at stake. Giving this
stakeholder—the chief executive stakeholder—a role in the
determination of constitutional meaning encourages his
genuine involvement in deliberation about that meaning.23

21. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (1992); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2
(1997); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 342-49
(2004); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action:
An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1611-15 (2001). A related body of
literature draws on parallels to engineering and industrial organization. See
William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule
Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 37-38 (Gráinne
de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267-78
(1998). Collaborative governance and stakeholder participation are also leading
themes in research on environmental regulation and dispute resolution. See,
e.g., MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 27, 201, 216-31
(2004) (discussing the Quincy Library Group); Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking
Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 441-45 (1999).
22. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 29.
23. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 18, at 100-01; discussion infra Part II.C.
Open contestation of constitutional meaning among the branches also
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And an executive with a hand in formulating constitutional
rules is more likely to be bound by them in practice.24 In this
respect, the president is no different from many business
firms; firms that participate in making the administrative
rules to which they are subject develop a kind of
“ownership” over them—and ownership brings fidelity.
Moderate
departmentalism
requires
no
major
alternations to the basic constitutional scheme. Rather, it
assumes that scheme, along with the “dialogical” process of
lawmaking, litigation, and executive action that the scheme
engenders. The difference comes in the informal norms
guiding this process. Consider, again, the legal challenge to
the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. The Court
holds a hearing on the challenge and considers the views of
executive attorneys on the matter. Suppose, this time, that
the Supreme Court does strike down the law as exceeding
Congress’s constitutional authority. In coming to this
conclusion, the Court announces its considered view of the
meaning of the Commerce Clause and the Taxing and
Spending Clause, and shows why the clauses do not support
the law. Under moderate departmentalism, the president
need not accept those interpretations. He may, in the
exercise of his constitutional powers, be guided by his own
considered views. What concrete effects this has will depend
on context; the president might decide to enforce the
Affordable Care Act despite the Court’s decision
invalidating it, but he might not, for reasons I discuss
below. He might decline to enforce the Act, but continue to
enforce laws resting on similar constructions of the
Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause.
Whatever the president decides to do, the possibility of his
acting independently encourages the Court to seriously
consider his views and to fashion a rule that reflects them.
Instead of the Court binding the president to fundamental
law, departmentalism conceives of the president as binding
incentivizes the people to actively involve themselves in determining
constitutional meaning. See BURGESS, supra note 18, at 13-14, 121-26.
24. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 73 (“If the political branches strongly
disagree with the [legally binding] judicial understanding, it will be ignored or
distinguished or limited to its facts.”).
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himself to law that he has influenced, and whose continued
observance is supported, from his perspective, by a variety
of moral, legal, and strategic reasons.
Indeed, the last point is significant, since the president’s
compliance with constitutional rules is not meant to follow
from the logic of participation alone. Under moderate
departmentalism, there are also important strategic reasons
for the president to voluntarily comply with constitutional
rules. The logic of what political scientists call “repeat play”
supplements the logic of participation.25 Where the
president’s participation in shaping a constitutional rule
does not convince him, on balance, that he should comply
with it, he may nonetheless comply to take advantage of
certain future benefits.26 I argue that two future benefits are
particularly important in this regard: first, avoiding future
litigation losses that would likely follow from ignoring a
constitutional rule announced by the Supreme Court; and
second, obtaining future gains available only to a president
with a reputation for compliance with constitutional law—a
matter of significance in a political system like our own. 27
Such reasons make compliance rational for the president
even where it comes at his present cost, say, by preventing
him from using the full resources of the executive branch to
achieve a favored policy.28 Additionally, a president who
wants to avoid these costs will have reason to more fully
participate in interbranch processes for determining
constitutional meaning.29
This, in a nutshell, is the case for moderate
departmentalism I develop below. The argument cuts across
the extant departmentalism literature in an unusual way.
One can identify in the literature distinct approaches to the
study of presidential interpretation. One approach is
25. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 51; discussion infra Part
II.D.1.
26. See discussion infra Part II.D.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Cf. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 47 (discussing mutual
cooperativeness, which results in long term beneficial payoffs).
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institutional in focus. These studies describe historical
patterns of competition over interpretative authority
between the institutions of government.30 Scholarship in
this line tends to be both empirical and normative; it is
empirical insofar as its methods and subject are historical,
and it is normative insofar as it betrays (as it usually does)
some approval of departmentalism. A second approach is
legal, or “analytic,” in focus.31 These studies examine which
30. See, e.g., AGRESTO, supra note 18, at 9-10 (arguing constitutional
interpretation was never intended to be in the sole province of the courts);
BURGESS, supra note 18, at x-xii, 107 (examining congressional challenges to
presidential assertions of authority in the war powers debates); FISHER, supra
note 18, at 200-70 (analyzing the methods used by the president to curb
judiciary overreaches); WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 5, 15 (examining how
the doctrine of separation of powers is affected by the institutional struggle for
constitutional leadership); Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 425-59 (examining
departmentalism during the demise of the Whig conception of the presidency);
Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review? Schooner Peggy and the Early
Marshall Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 221, 224, 232-35 (1998) [hereinafter Graber,
Establishing Judicial Review?] (arguing the early Marshall Court sought to
preserve judicial power by asserting its existence, while not attempting to
challenge executive or legislative authority in any controversial way); Mark A.
Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36-37 (1993) [hereinafter Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty] (arguing scholars should think about judicial review as presenting
the nonmajoritarian difficulty because the real controversy is not between the
elected officials and the judiciary, but rather between the different members of
the dominant coalition).
31. This body of scholarship is already considerable and still growing. See,
e.g., William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1990); Dawn E.
Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable
Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000) [hereinafter Johnsen, Presidential
Non-Enforcement]; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power
of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Sanford Levinson,
Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael
Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373 (1994); Christopher N.
May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865 (1994); Merrill, supra note 19; Arthur
S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV.
389 (1987); Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13; Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous
Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993); Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws,
96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008); Neomi Rao, The President’s Sphere of Action, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 527 (2009); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of
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allocations of interpretative authority are lawful. Naturally,
legal studies adduce traditional sources of constitutional
argument—text, structure, and history—to defend a
particular separation of judicial and executive power. Like
the institutional studies, they tend to combine the
descriptive and the normative.
This Article falls in neither category. It is largely an
institutional analysis, not a legal one; but it is also a
theoretical analysis, not an empirical one. My hope is the
approach speaks to both bodies of literature, and thus
shows how institutional analysis can inform structural and
doctrinal conclusions about the proper division of
interpretative authority. Just to pick one example: a Court
without the authority to decide constitutional questions for
the other branches—as departmentalism envisions—need
not rely on justiciability doctrines to limit the reach of its
decisions. Its opinion on, say, the president’s war powers, is
just that—its opinion. Whether the opinion is followed
depends not on the Court’s ipse dixit, but on “organic”
factors: on whether the president meaningfully participated
in its formulation, thus giving him a reason to adopt the
Court’s view as his own.
I. THE IDEA OF “MODERATE” DEPARTMENTALISM
The terms of the debate over departmentalism are by
now relatively familiar. For a variety of reasons, it has
become largely a debate about the relative interpretative
roles of the Supreme Court and the president, not
Congress.32 The central question posed in this debate is the
extent of presidential interpretative power.33 A president
may exercise the power of interpretation in a number of
the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113 (1993) [hereinafter Strauss,
Presidential Interpretation]; Daniel J. Crooks, III, In Defense of the Obama
Administration’s Non-Defense of DOMA, 4 LEGIS. & POL’Y BRIEF (Aug. 5, 2012),
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&conte
xt=lpb.
32. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 16-17. This is not to say that there
are no important questions regarding Congress’s interpretative powers. See
TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 17; Katyal, supra note 17, at 336.
33. See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 31, at 1271.
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different ways; each raises a question about executive
authority. For example, may the president decline to enforce
a statute he believes is unconstitutional? What about a
judgment? What about his obligation to defend laws
challenged in court—may he decline to defend a law he
believes is unconstitutional?
In this Part, I answer some of these questions. I defend
what
I
call
(rather
tendentiously)
“moderate”
departmentalism.34 In my usage, moderate departmentalism
is the view that judicial precedent does not bind the
president.35 Stare decisis is given “vertical” scope, within the
federal courts (and state courts, where they interpret
federal law), but zero “horizontal” scope among the branches
of the federal government. Although precedent does not
bind the president, a valid legal judgment may—at least
when it requires the president to do something.36 The
ultimate burden of the Article is to show that this form of
departmentalism engenders interbranch collaboration about
the content of constitutional law—in short, that “moderate”
departmentalism is “collaborative” departmentalism. Before
I get there, however, I need to describe moderate
departmentalism in more detail.
A. The Argument from Coordinacy
Moderate departmentalism is a view about judicial
precedent. Specifically, it is a view about which institutions
of government are bound by judicial precedent. The core
idea is that whether an institution is bound depends on its
“rank” or “status” in the constitutional system.
The framers regarded the departments created by the
opening sections of Articles I, II, and III as being equal in

34. This appellation has also been used to describe a different theory—
Strauss’s view that the president has the same relationship to Supreme Court
precedent as the Court itself does. Id. at 1298. The usage has not gained
currency.
35. Thomas Merrill is probably the leading defender of this view. See Merrill,
supra note 19, at 43-44.
36. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 31, at 1812.
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status.37 In the language of the eighteenth century, the
departments were “co-ordinate.”38 The issue came up as the
framers tried to imagine how governmental violations of the
Constitution might be corrected. For example, in the
proposed constitution appended to his Notes on the State of
Virginia, Jefferson suggested that such violations should be
determined and corrected by a convention of the people. 39
The people, he thought, were the only ones with the
authority to do such a thing.40 Madison took up the
suggestion in The Federalist No. 49. He agreed with
Jefferson that the design of the federal government seemed
to necessitate popular appeal in such a circumstance; after
all, no single department had been given the authority to
correct the transgressions of the others.41 Instead, he wrote,
the people had made the departments “perfectly co-ordinate
by the terms of their common commission.”42 The point fit
neatly in the framers’ emerging theory of separation of
powers, which understood the departments not as
representing different orders or estates of society, but as
“essentially indistinguishable” representatives of the
American people.43
Coordinacy was an idea familiar to the framers from
English oppositional thought in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Indeed, coordinacy had played a lead
role
in
the
exchange
of
pamphlets
between
parliamentarians and royalists at the opening of the
37. See SCIGLIANO, supra note 13, at 7; Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch,
supra note 13, at 231-32, 324-35.
38. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 273 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed.,
2005) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST NO. 49].
39. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES
(Forgotten Books 2012) (1829).

ON THE

STATE

OF

VIRGINIA, 233-34

40. See id. at 172-79, 233-34.
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 38, at 273.
42. Id.
43. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787,
at 453 (1998 ed. 1998); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 276-77 (1996). The medieval
English estates were the “lords temporal,” “lords spiritual,” and “commons,”
which, in conjunction with the king, made up Parliament.
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English Civil War.44 In response to the commons and lords’
assertion that they possessed several powers traditionally
regarded as royal, Charles I had argued that the houses
were equal in status to the king.45 Each, he said, was an
“estate” in the English government. Yet Charles’s
description of king, lords, and commons as estates was a
marked contrast with the traditional view, which had
recognized bishops, lords, and commons as the estates,
making the king the head of the government.46
Parliamentarians seized on Charles’s concession as proof
that English government had always been “mixt,” its
exercises of power the result of “coordination” between king,
lords, and commons.47 Each of these estates, they argued,
must consent to enact a law; and each estate necessarily
enjoyed the power to resist the actions of the others.48 This
would be possible only if the estates were equal in status or
rank (“co-ordinate,” or “coordinative,” as Charles Herle
termed it); otherwise one part would subordinate the
others.49 The idea proved to have staying power. It persisted
through England’s experiment with republicanism in the

44. J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 8889 (1955). This literature was familiar to the framers. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 34 (1992 ed.).
45. W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 25 (1965).

THE

46. See, e.g., M.R.L.L. Kelly, Historical Analysis of Goldsworthy’s Sovereignty
of Parliament, 27 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 156, 166 (2002); C. C. Weston, The Theory
of Mixed Monarchy Under Charles I and After, 75 ENG. HIST. REV. 426, 428
(1960).
47. Charles Herle, A Fuller Answer to a Treatise Written by Doctor Ferne
(1642), in 1 THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY: SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH
POLITICAL TRACTS 157-59 (Joyce Lee Malcom ed., 1999); see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION 361-71 (1975); Weston, supra note 46, at 431-35.
48. See Herle, supra note 47.
49. See id. In a later pamphlet, Herle advanced the view that Commons was
superior to the King in the lawmaking function, but coordinate in the executive
function. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
43-44 (2d ed. 1998).
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Commonwealth period and the Restoration at century’s
end.50
Coordinacy was thus firmly rooted in the vocabulary of
eighteenth century political theory, and it is no surprise
that it figured centrally in several American framers’ plans.
As we have already seen, Madison thought it essential to
understanding how constitutional boundaries would be
enforced. Thus, in Federalist No. 49, he argued that because
the departments were “co-ordinate by terms of their
common commission,” no single department could “pretend
to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries
between their respective powers.”51 Enforcement had to
utilize another mechanism. That mechanism, of course, is
described in Federalist No. 51: departmental boundaries
would be enforced not by a superior department, but by
arranging the coordinate departments so that each checked
the others by the exercise of its own powers.52 As Herle had
suggested, the departments would only be able to resist one
another if they were equal in status. Making one
department “exclusive or superior” in questions of
constitutional interpretation would be inconsistent with this
design.53
While the lesson of Federalist No. 51 is a familiar one,
Madison left the connection to interpretative authority
somewhat underdeveloped. Yet it is fairly straightforward
to imagine how the argument might go. Consider the
following, which expands on Madison’s claims.54 The
departments are coordinate. This means they are equal in
status. Since each branch is equal in status to the others,
each is entitled to determine for itself how it should exercise
50. See VILE, supra note 49, at 44, 75, 120.
51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 38, at 273.
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 281 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005); see
KRAMER, supra note 16, at 47.
53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 38, at 273; see Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 233-35.
54. The following draws heavily on arguments made by Michael Stokes
Paulsen and David Strauss. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra
note 13, at 228-40; Strauss, Presidential Interpretation, supra note 31, at 121;
see also Lawson & Moore, supra note 31, at 1287.
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its expressly delegated powers. In other words, each is
“independent” in the sense of being autonomous: no branch
decides for another how the latter should act. What less
could “coordinacy” mean? Now consider the power of
constitutional interpretation. None of the branches is
expressly delegated this power. Since constitutional
interpretation gives content and scope to the expressly
delegated powers, each branch must also be entitled to
conduct the requisite constitutional interpretation according
to its own best judgment.
A variant of the same argument can be made using a
comparison to the courts. A lower federal court is bound by
the constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court.
This is because lower federal courts are “inferior,” in the
language of Article III, to the Supreme Court.55 But the
president is not inferior to the Supreme Court; the
president is equal in rank to the Supreme Court, as head of
a coordinate branch of the federal government. Therefore,
the president is not similarly obliged to follow the
constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court—unless
there is an independent argument to that end that is
otherwise consistent with coordinacy.56 With respect to
Supreme Court precedent, the president should be in the
same position as the Court itself is: namely, as always
possessing the authority to depart from precedent where
doing so is appropriate.57
It may help to run the argument in the other direction.
Suppose that the president does not have the authority to
independently interpret the Constitution. What, then, do we
make of the pardon power? It is accepted that the president
may invoke constitutional grounds to pardon an individual
duly convicted of a crime in a federal court.58 Indeed, given
that the pardon power limits the actions of the federal
judiciary, it would constitute a radical rethinking of that
55. The argument treats this assertion as an assumption. It need not be. See
Baude, supra note 31, at 1845 & n.213.
56. See Strauss, Presidential Interpretation, supra note 31, at 120.
57. See id.
58. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 264-65.
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power to insist that it could be exercised only in
conformance
with
judicial
constructions
of
the
Constitution.59 Much the same can be said for the veto
power; no one expects that the president should be confined
to judicial precedent in deciding whether to veto a presented
bill on constitutional grounds.60
This is the argument from coordinacy. It begins with
the idea that the departments are equal in status or rank.
Its conclusion is that each department must enjoy authority
to independently interpret the Constitution. No one
department is the Constitution’s exclusive or superior
interpreter.
B. What Coordinacy Does and Does Not Imply
All this is rather abstract. What does coordinacy mean
for the specific questions, posed above, about executive
authority?
Consider first the familiar issue of “non-enforcement.”
Non-enforcement is the president’s power to refuse to carry
out the law because he believes it unconstitutional. A wellknown example is President Reagan’s refusal to enforce
provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.61
The Act permitted losing bidders on federal contracts to
lodge a “protest” with the Comptroller General’s Office.62
The Comptroller General was tasked with investigating the
protest, during the pendency of which the contract could not
be awarded to the winning bidder.63 Reagan’s
59. This is not to say that the pardon is merely an instrument of “clemency.”
The pardon has a key law enforcement function as well, especially when used in
exchange for favorable testimony or to incentivize compromise. See EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 180-81 (5th rev. ed.
1984) [hereinafter CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT]; THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 397-98
(Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). Yet this function rests on the
judiciary-limiting effect of the pardon.
60. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 264-65.
61. 98 Stat. 1199 (1984) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011)); see also Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prod. Div. v.
Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1988).
62. See § 3552.
63. See § 3553(c)(1), (d)(1).
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administration instructed the agencies to disregard this
stay provision; according to its view, the provision delegated
to an officer of Congress (the Comptroller General) duties
that belonged to executive officials, thus violating the
separation of powers.64 Federal courts were highly critical of
the administration’s conduct at the time.65 Yet since that
time, judgment on the matter has shifted, at least among
scholars of presidential power;66 today, most conclude that
the Constitution supports some form of presidential nonenforcement power.67
Coordinacy is agnostic about non-enforcement. In other
words, it is consistent with the conclusion that the president
enjoys such a power, and with the conclusion that he does
not. This is contrary to how coordinacy is sometimes
presented.68 The reason coordinacy is consistent with both
views is that the case for non-enforcement turns on the
construction of the Take Care Clause and the Article II
Oath Clause, and coordinacy is logically independent of the
best construction of those clauses.69 Read either clause in a
certain way, and it defeats the case for non-enforcement.
Coordinacy cannot rule these readings out.
Consider, for example, the Take Care Clause, which
requires that the president “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”70 The plain language of the clause
64. See Lehman, 842 F.2d at 1102, 1105, 1119-20.
65. See, e.g., id. at 1126; cf. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787
F.2d 875, 889-90 & 889 n.11 (3d Cir. 1986).
66. This is true across the political spectrum. Compare Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 268-70, with Johnsen, Presidential NonEnforcement, supra note 31, at 14-15.
67. For a recent summary of the literature, see Prakash, supra note 31, at
1618-28.
68. See, e.g., Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 240, 267
(stating that it is a “logical consequence” of Madison’s statement of coordinacy
that the President enjoys interpretative powers including non-enforcement).
69. See Strauss, Presidential Interpretation, supra note 31, at 117. The
following argument focuses on the Take Care Clause. For the reading of the
Oath Clause that poses a problem for non-enforcement, see Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 260.
70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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imposes a duty on the president to see that the law is
enforced. The question is whether that duty extends to laws
the president regards as unconstitutional. There is some
reason to think that it does; a number of (now well-known)
historical and structural considerations support an
affirmative answer.71 The principal evidence is the
interlocking character of the Take Care Clause and the
Presentment Clause. Presentment empowers Congress to
override a president’s constitutional veto.72 The framers
thus contemplated that the president would be faced with
enforcing a law he believed unconstitutional, and plain
language suggests that Take Care was intended to require
the president to do just this—ruling out a power of nonenforcement.73
The point is not to endorse this particular reading of the
Take Care Clause. The point is, rather, that (1) it is a
reasonable reading, (2) it would rule out a power of nonenforcement, and (3) coordinacy does not require its
rejection. For those who disagree that it is a reasonable
reading (perhaps because it does not permit exceptions to
the duty to enforce), other constructions are also possible; a
number of these constructions do allow exceptions but rule
out a broad power of non-enforcement.74 Coordinacy does not
exclude these possibilities—indeed, it simply does not
require any particular construction of the Take Care
Clause.75 Of course, coordinacy might weigh in favor of one
71. These considerations can be found in Johnsen, Presidential NonEnforcement, supra note 31, and May, supra note 31.
72. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
73. See May, supra note 31, at 876-81. A full defense of this position would
require addressing the differences between the veto and non-enforcement, the
issue posed by laws enacted prior to the president’s term, and the relevant
founding-era evidence on presidential power.
74. See, e.g., Strauss, Presidential Interpretation, supra note 31, at 118 (“Or
suppose the correct interpretation of the Take Care Clause is that the President
must comply with any statute that is not clearly unconstitutional unless that
statute infringes the President’s prerogatives.”).
75. See id. at 117-19. No one—with the possible exception of Paulsen—
maintains that non-enforcement follows from coordinacy alone. See Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 241-44, 256-57. Instead, it is said to
follow from presidential powers implied by the Take Care Clause, the Oath
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interpretation and against another. But it is unclear which
way this should cut. Would it be more appropriate to reject
a construction of the Take Care Clause because it conflicted
with coordinacy or conclude that the clause was meant to
mark coordinacy’s outer limits? A well-supported
construction of the Take Care Clause might teach us what
coordinacy can and cannot mean.76
Coordinacy is thus agnostic with respect to the nonenforcement power. The same cannot be said for what is
sometimes called “non-acquiescence.” Coordinacy does imply
non-acquiescence, and thus, if one accepts the principle of
coordinacy, one ought to support a presidential power of
non-acquiescence.
Non-acquiescence is the power to refuse to adopt a legal
rule outside the context of the specific lawsuit in which it is
announced.77 Like non-enforcement, it has a rather long
history. Recent times again afford the example of President
Clause, and the Article II Vesting Clause, in addition to the principle of
coordinacy. See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 31, at 1280; Easterbrook,
supra note 31, at 910, 920. This implies that if alternative readings of those
clauses are available, one can (consistently) endorse coordinacy but not nonenforcement.
76. Here is how Take Care might shed light on coordinacy. Some argue that
coordinacy implies what we might call “strong departmental independence.”
Strong departmental independence means that each department may freely
interpret the Constitution, regardless of the actions taken by the others. In other
words, no department can force another to take action inconsistent with the
latter’s understanding of the Constitution. See, e.g., FARBER, supra note 14, at
182; Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 221-22. This
principle, however, is likely too strong, since it implies a freedom from
interference or constraint, which (on its face, at least) is in tension with the
doctrine of checks and balances. See FISHER, supra note 18, at 238-39. In
contrast, departmental autonomy is the idea that each department is
“independent” in the sense of being self-directed, but not immune from
interference by the actions of others. See discussion supra Part I.A. This view
contemplates that a department might be prevented, by the actions of another,
from taking action to realize its view of the Constitution. A Take Care duty to
enforce captures this idea perfectly: it requires the president to implement
Congress’s views of the Constitution.
77. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by
Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 687 (1989); Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 272; Strauss, Presidential
Interpretation, supra note 31, at 120-21.
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Reagan, under whom certain agencies developed a practice
of refusing to adopt in administrative proceedings the
judicial precedents of the reviewing court of appeals.78 Yet
intra-circuit non-acquiescence (as it was lovingly called) was
not really departmentalism, since, as its defenders
conceded, the Supreme Court remained the final arbiter of
the meaning of federal law.79 Non-acquiescence to the
Supreme Court is instead exemplified by the more distant
example of President Lincoln and the Dred Scott decision.80
In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln suggested that
while the decision of the Supreme Court “must be binding in
any case, upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that
suit,” it did not bind others, including members of Congress
and the administration.81 It was inconsistent with popular
rule, he argued, for the “policy of the government, upon vital
questions, affecting the whole people” to be set by the Court
alone.82 As he had put it during the campaign:
[W]e . . . oppose that decision [i.e., Dred Scott] as a political rule
which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks
it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or
the president to favor no measure that does not actually concur
with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound
83
by it as a political rule in that way.

Lincoln thus distinguished a judicial decision from what
might be called the constitutional “rule” on which it was
based, and exempted presidents from a legal obligation to
78. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 77, at 694, 706.
79. See id. at 723, 725 (arguing that “the co-equal branch analogy” defended
by Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese is inconsistent with the
interpretative role of the Court as described in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958)).
80. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
81. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); see
also FARBER, supra note 14, at 179.
82. Lincoln, supra note 81, at 268.
83. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 275 (quoting
Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Quincy, Ill. (Oct.
13, 1858), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 81, at
245, 255); see also AGRESTO, supra note 18, at 128.
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adopt the latter.84 Indeed, President Lincoln went on to take
action inconsistent with constitutional “rules” in Dred
Scott.85
It should be fairly clear that “non-acquiescence” in this
sense is implied by the principle of coordinacy. If the
political departments were obligated to adopt the rules
announced by the Court, they would consequently not be
free, as coordinacy requires, to exercise their powers
according to their own understanding of the Constitution.
What is somewhat harder to grasp is what non-acquiescence
means in practice. The impact of the president’s refusal to
adopt a constitutional interpretation announced by the
Supreme Court will depend on the context. For example,
because the president’s decision to pardon someone is
regarded as judicially unreviewable, it is unlikely to lead to
further legal action, even if it is based on a view of the
Constitution at odds with the Court.86 Something similar
goes for the veto.87 In these contexts, a regime of nonacquiescence is functionally indistinguishable from a regime
of judicial supremacy.
The matter gets more complicated when we consider
other forms of presidential non-acquiescence. Suppose the
Court applies the canon of constitutional avoidance to
construe a statute so that it complies with the Constitution,
and in so doing narrows a grant of executive power
conferred under that statute. In this case, the president’s
decision not to adopt the Court’s construction could have a
number of consequences whose effect is to force him to
adopt the Court’s view. Most obviously, the president’s
decision to non-acquiesce would give rise to further
litigation that, governed by the Supreme Court’s rule, would
lead to the same outcome—although the matter is
somewhat more complicated, as I consider below.
84. As Herbert Wechsler summarized Lincoln’s view, “the Court decides a
case; it does not pass a statute calling for obedience by all within the purview of
the rule that is declared.” Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1965).
85. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 276.
86. See id. at 265.
87. See id. at 264-65.
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Alternatively, Congress might decide to side with the Court,
and use its lawmaking power to amend the language of the
statute so as to reflect the Court’s views.88 Depending on
one’s view of the Take Care Clause, this could create an
obligation in the president to accede to Congress’s view. Yet
these mechanisms, as well as the many other means of
controlling the president available to the Congress and the
Court89 hardly eliminate the effects of non-acquiescence.
Where federal courts lack jurisdiction, judicial review of the
president’s non-acquiescence will be unavailable. Congress
may take action to limit or strip jurisdiction so as to protect
the president’s constitutional views.90 Even where
jurisdiction exists, not all those affected by the president’s
policy will be able to bring suit.91 The reality is that the
president, more than any other federal officer or legislator,
conducts a large amount of activity without external
supervision, and over a time scale and in conditions that
effectively preclude interference by another branch.92
In short, a presidential policy of non-acquiescence would
matter.93 Going forward, I will use the expression “moderate
departmentalism” to describe presidential interpretative
powers, rather than non-enforcement or non-acquiescence.
This expression is intended to describe an allocation of
interpretative authority that, as I have argued, follows from
88. Cf. Rao, supra note 31, at 534-35 (discussing Congress’s use of the
lawmaking power to advance its view of constitutional meaning).
89. The devices are numerous, and include, on the congressional side, (1)
impeachment, (2) amendment, (3) eliminating executive funding, (4) impeding
appointments, and (5) conducting investigations, as well as others. See generally
id. On the judicial side, mechanisms of control include injunctions and
contempt.
90. The classic exploration of this idea is in Wechsler, supra note 84, at 100406.
91. Standing doctrine will narrow those who can bring suit. See Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984).
92. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 7-12 (2010).
93. Indeed, when Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese defended what
was essentially moderate departmentalism, it caused a political firestorm. See
Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 991, 991-93 (1987).
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the principle of coordinacy—namely, non-acquiescence
without a general power of non-enforcement.94 In addition,
as described above, I assume the president is obliged to
enforce valid legal judgments. I take no position on the
many other questions of presidential interpretative
authority, such as the duty to defend a law in court.95 Below,
I describe this suite of presidential powers and obligations
as the elimination of the “horizontal” dimension of stare
decisis.96
II. WHY MODERATE DEPARTMENTALISM IS COLLABORATIVE
My argument in this Part is that moderate
departmentalism is collaborative. In other words, I want to
show how moderate departmentalism results not in
presidential interpretative supremacy, but in a collaborative
effort to determine constitutional meaning and in greater
presidential compliance with the law.
This argument challenges certain prevailing views in
the institutional literature on departmentalism. In
particular, the literature describes departmentalism as a
kind of zero-sum contest over the allocation of interpretative
authority, and thus regards presidential assertions of
interpretative authority as ipso facto judicial deprivations.
The analysis is important and insightful, but it also limits
our understanding of departmentalism. I want to show how
this is the case by examining the work of Keith Whittington
and Stephen Skowronek on presidential leadership and the
Supreme Court.

94. This view of presidential interpretative authority has been defended
before, but appears to have been eclipsed somewhat by the movement in recent
scholarship towards non-enforcement power. See AGRESTO, supra note 18, at
128-29; Neuborne, supra note 93; cf. BURGESS, supra note 18, at 109-26; FISHER,
supra note 18, at 231-47, 275-79; Murphy, supra note 18, at 417.
95. I do assume that the president has the power to decline to enforce a law
the Supreme Court has invalidated, or a law similar to one invalidated. He also
has the authority to pardon and veto on the basis of his views about
constitutional meaning.
96. Cf. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 237 (invoking
similar terminology to analyze theories of judicial supremacy).
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A. Two Views of Departmentalism
1. From Skowronek to Whittington on Presidential
Leadership. I begin with Skowronek’s model of leadership.
Presidential leadership, argues Skowronek, is a matter of
the president’s authority to exercise his powers in ways that
give effect to his vision for society.97 This authority is not
fixed, but depends on political context. Thus, although the
office of the presidency is, by its nature, potentially
disruptive of the existing “constitutional regime,” few
presidents are able to realize this potential.98 Most find
themselves in a political context in which so using their
power would be impossible or irrational given the cost.
Indeed, there is only one major exception. According to
Skowronek, when the extant regime is weak, or failing, and
the president enters office openly opposed to it, a
“reconstructive” politics of leadership is possible, in which
the president uses the powers of his office to essentially
“remake” American government.99 Think, says Skowronek,
of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, who
came into office as the constitutional regime was crumbing,
who had campaigned essentially against that regime, and
who succeeded in replacing it with one premised on a very
different view of political society.100 For such presidents, he
says,
the
“order-shattering”
and
“order-affirming”
dimensions of the presidency converge: the president
disposes of the failing regime and creates a new one by
reinterpreting the “mythic” first principles of our system.101
Keith Whittington extends Skowronek’s analysis to the
constitutional dimension of leadership. According to
Whittington, constitutional claims are an essential aspect of
97. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 24 (1993).
98. In this context, “constitutional regime” refers to the basic “arrangement”
of the institutions of government and to the “commitments of ideology and
interest[s]” those arrangements embody. See id. at 34; see also Jack M. Balkin,
The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1129, 1135 (2012) (defining
“constitutional regime”).
99. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 97, at 37.
100. Id. at 36-37.
101. See id. at 20, 37.
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political leadership, and thus, a variety of political actors
assert such claims. History evidences major shifts in whose
constitutional claims are regarded as authoritative; as
Whittington describes, presidents, legislative leaders, the
Supreme Court, state governors, citizens, and associations
have all claimed, and exercised, independent interpretative
authority.102 Success for one of these actors comes at the
expense of the others. Leaders strengthen their position by
resting their agenda on constitutional foundations, and by
undermining the interpretative claims of their competitors.
The result, at least at times, is an open struggle for
interpretative supremacy. As Whittington describes it,
“various political actors have struggled for the authority to
interpret the Constitution. They have sought to displace
other potential constitutional interpreters, and to assert
their own primary authority to determine the content of
contested constitutional principles.”103
Reconstructive presidents, in particular, regard
interpretative authority as essential to their task. 104
Consider again the features of reconstructive politics, in
which the president comes to power while the extant regime
is faltering, perhaps because it has failed to meet the
challenges of the day. The reconstructive president stakes
his “warrant” for exercising power on a fundamental
opposition to that regime.105 That opposition, argues
Whittington, must be expressed in constitutional terms.
Reconstructive efforts rest on the ability of the president to
articulate a compelling “constitutional vision”: a “positive
vision of how political power should be used” that is both
rooted in the Constitution and supports the president’s
specific public policy objectives.106 For example, Jefferson’s
102. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 15, 51; cf. Daryl J. Levinson,
Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124
HARV. L. REV. 657, 729 (2011) [hereinafter Levinson, Parchment and Politics]
(describing the shift of powers between Congress and other institutions and
actors).
103. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 15.
104. See id. at 49-71 (describing the reconstructive presidents).
105. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 97, at 34.
106. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 53-54.
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election in 1800 “meant saving the Constitution from the
Federalists’ centralizing and monarchical tendencies.”107
Similarly, Roosevelt’s defense of the New Deal aimed to
provide a constitutional basis for policies securing economic
social justice.108
These claims bring the president into conflict with the
courts. The judiciary, Whittington says, poses “an intrinsic
challenge” to the president’s effort to articulate a new
constitutional vision, and ongoing judicial interpretation of
the Constitution “necessarily frustrates” presidential
reconstructive ambitions.109 This is true regardless of
whether the courts actively attack presidential initiatives;
their authority alone constitutes a “threat” to the
reconstruction.110 The threat leads reconstructive presidents
to attack the courts, framing any judicial efforts to defend
the dominant regime as “political” interference rather than
proper “legal” decision-making.111 Once the Court is viewed
as “simply taking sides,” the president’s interpretative
authority is enhanced.112 In Whittington’s words, the
reconstructive president and the judiciary “compete over the
same constitutional space, with the authority of presidents
to reconstruct the inherited order supplanting judicial
authority to settle disputed constitutional meaning.”113
2. Transferring Authority and Sharing Authority.
Nothing in Whittington’s argument implies that
departmentalism is necessarily reconstructive. The
argument runs in the other direction. Yet if certain aspects
of the argument are emphasized, the connection between
departmentalism and reconstruction becomes so strong that
107. Id. at 54.
108. See id. at 57-58.
109. Id. at 52. But cf. id. at 53 (“Reconstructive presidents need not be hostile
to courts per se or judicial review in general. For most presidents, there may be
occasional disagreements with the Court and efforts to alter the trajectory of
constitutional law, but there is no crisis of, or challenge to, judicial authority.”).
110. Id. at 74.
111. See id. at 66.
112. Id. at 69-70.
113. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
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it is difficult to understand how departmentalism is possible
outside the reconstructive enterprise. Departmentalism, we
might say, emphasizing a strand in the argument above, is
essentially a presidential justification for taking
interpretative power away from another political actor. Yet
taking interpretative power is something possible and
desirable only within the politics of reconstruction (more
precisely, it defines such a politics).114 Skowronek’s
“affiliated” presidents have little interest in exercising such
a power, given its costs. And Skowronek’s “preemptive”
leaders—presidents opposed to a vibrant (not failing)
regime—generally lack the political strength to mount the
challenge.115 From this perspective, departmentalism is best
understood as a tool, or means, of reconstruction. But if it is
a means of reconstruction, then a fortiori it is limited to
reconstruction.
What’s being emphasized, in effect, is the “zero-sum”
character of changes in interpretative authority.116 An
examination of Whittington’s language suggests the
emphasis is a fair one. He tells us, for example, that the
president and the courts “compete over the same
constitutional space,”117 that the reconstructive president
must “supplant[] judicial authority to settle disputed
114. To be sure, Whittington doesn’t associate departmentalism exclusively
with reconstructive presidents. He explores the use of the veto power by nonreconstructive presidents to advance their interpretations of the Constitution.
See id. at 170-95. Yet this “domesticated departmentalism,” as Whittington calls
it, is quite modest. See id. at 170. In fact, it is not clear whether domesticated
departmentalism is properly regarded as departmentalism at all; according to
Whittington, non-reconstructive presidents who used the veto to advance their
constitutional interpretations were “careful to recognize the superior warrants
of the Court to act as the ultimate constitutional interpreter.” Id. at 171. This,
however, is judicial supremacy. Moreover, elsewhere Whittington does suggest
that (non-domesticated) departmentalism is “fundamentally connected to the
politics of reconstruction.” See id. at 50, 77-80.
115. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 161.
116. Here I mean to draw on the idea of zero-sum games as developed in game
theory. See DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION 13-14 (2002); ANATOL RAPOPORT, TWOPERSON GAME THEORY: THE ESSENTIAL IDEAS 94-95 (1966); Richard H. McAdams,
Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 209, 218-19 (2009).
117. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 52.
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constitutional meaning,”118 that “[t]he president reclaims the
authority
of
[interpreting]
the
Constitution
by
delegitimating the supremacy of the Court,”119 that
“[s]hifting the right to render authoritative decisions
regarding contested constitutional meaning from presidents
and legislators to judges increases the power of the latter at
the expense of the former,”120 that “[i]nterpretative authority
cannot be wrested from the judiciary without being placed
elsewhere,”121 and that, “[a]s presidential authority to
interpret the Constitution wanes, judicial authority
waxes.”122 In these places—and indeed throughout Political
Foundations of Judicial Supremacy—it appears that
Whittington conceives of changes in the allocation of
interpretative power as being essentially zero-sum.
Presidential gain is associated with an equivalent loss in
another branch, usually the Supreme Court.
In other words, for Whittington, changes in
interpretative authority are transfers. Presidential
assertions of authority do not create interpretative power,
or destroy it, but merely cause its redistribution from one
actor to another. To be sure, the direction of the
redistribution is variable. In periods of reconstruction, the
president finds it desirable to take interpretative authority
for himself, while in other periods, he finds it desirable to
give interpretative authority to the Court, perhaps to avoid
blame for resolving a contentious issue, or permit his
coalition to engage in “position taking.”123 In either case,
however, the game of interpretative authority is clearly
118. Id.
119. Id. at 74.
120. Id. at 84.
121. Id. at 22.
122. Id. at 287.
123. See id. at 84-87; cf. Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 102, at
726-28. That it is to the president’s advantage to cede interpretative power does
not show that the game is non-zero-sum. The dispositive matter is whether
interpretative authority increases or decreases. What utility the president
assigns to his interpretative authority is up to him. See RAPOPORT, supra note
116, at 36 (“How one assigns utilities to outcomes is the decision-maker’s
private affair.”).
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zero-sum, or “purely competitive,” since one player’s loss is
the other player’s gain.124
Consider for a moment whether it is possible to play a
non-zero-sum game of interpretative authority. This is what
some game theorists call a game of “coordination” (as
opposed to game of “competition”), although it is probably
not a game of pure coordination.125 In posing this question,
what I want to know is whether it is possible for the
president and the Supreme Court to act in ways that
increase the interpretative authority of both actors. It is
tempting to suppose that such a thing must be impossible.
After all, if the president decides on the meaning of the
Constitution, then the Supreme Court cannot, and vice
versa.126 But the temptation is not quite right. In another
sense of “decide,” both the president and the Court surely
can decide on the meaning of the Constitution. They can
decide together. This is a thing we normally say (about
decisions, if not constitutional ones specifically); it reflects
the intuition that some decisions are made jointly. If,
indeed, it is possible for the president and the Court to
decide together on constitutional meaning, then it is
possible to play a non-zero-sum game of interpretative
authority. And if it is possible to play such a game, then we
have reason to conclude that departmentalism is something
more, or something else, than a means of presidential
reconstruction.
What would it mean, precisely, for the president and
the Supreme Court to decide on constitutional meaning
together? One possibility makes use of the idea of
“collaboration.” In his influential study of the presidency,
124. See supra note 116 (describing these concepts). This is not to say that it
would be impossible to model a different non-zero-sum game on Whittington’s
account; but it would not be a game whose payoff was solely interpretative
authority.
125. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 83-89 (1960). Note
that Richard McAdams uses the expression “coordination problem” differently,
to refer to non-trivial games of coordination, thus distinguishing the Stag Hunt,
Battle of the Sexes, and Hawk-Dove from the non-iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
See McAdams, supra note 116, at 218-19.
126. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 84.
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Edward S. Corwin argued that “departmental autonomy”—
an expression he used to describe the view that, among
other things, each branch of the federal government should
“be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution”—could
result in collaborative decision-making between the
president and Congress.127 Corwin pointed to a dispute
between President James Monroe and Representative
Henry Clay over the recognition of newly formed
governments in 1820s South America. Clay had made
several attempts in Congress to recognize governments in
Chile and Buenos Aires. His efforts irritated some of
Monroe’s cabinet members, who considered recognition a
purely presidential authority. In response, Virginia
Representative George Tucker defended Clay’s actions as
simply an effort to communicate the congressional view of
the matter to the president.128 And, indeed, after further
such efforts, President Monroe delivered a message to
Congress stating, in effect, “that the time had come to
recognize the new republics and inviting Congress, if it
concurred in that view, to make the necessary
appropriations for carrying it into effect.”129
The Clay-Monroe exchange prompted Corwin to
remark, “[i]t is thus borne in upon one that the principle of
departmental autonomy does not necessarily spell
departmental conflict, but that mutual consultation and
collaboration are quite as logical deductions from it.”130 As
Corwin understood it, each branch, guided by its own
understanding of the Constitution, exercised its powers in
ways that invited responsive actions by the other, resulting
in a collaborative policy.131

127. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 59, at 21, 205, 469 n.19.
128. See id. at 217 (citing VI U.S. CONGRESS & THOMAS HART BENTON,
ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 168 (1857)).
129. Id. at 218 (internal citations omitted).
130. Id.
131. In this case, the policy was the object of collaboration. In other cases,
constitutional meaning—the allocation of constitutional powers—is the object of
collaboration. I draw no bright line between these two topics of interbranch
collaboration.
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This, in a nutshell, is the second of “two views of
departmentalism.” The first view is the familiar one, based
on the idea of interbranch competition over interpretative
authority. The second view of departmentalism is based
instead on the idea of interbranch collaboration. This view
is much less familiar, but it is not unknown.
B. The Idea of Interbranch Collaboration
By using the term “collaboration,” I mean to invoke
something more than the general idea of dialogue.
Interbranch dialogue is consistent with a regime of judicial
supremacy, as many others have shown.132 Interbranch
collaboration, I shall argue, is a unique benefit of moderate
departmentalism. What do I mean by “collaboration”?
Collaboration means jointly developing a solution to a
common problem. It involves dialogue, but more than
dialogue. What more, precisely? Here I want to draw upon
the model of collaboration developed in the scholarship on
“new governance”133 or “collaborative governance.”134 This
literature ranges widely, but, in general, it describes the
features of what might be called “administrative
collaboration”: collaboration between government agencies
and business firms over the content, implementation, and
enforcement of administrative rules. What is distinctive
132. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 18; Dorf & Friedman, supra note 18, at 62;
see also Friedman, supra note 18.
133. See Lobel, supra note 21, at 344 (describing the model as decentralization
that integrates law, economics, and critical legal scholarship, and promising
dialogue between the interested, opposing parties); Salamon, supra note 21
(defining its collaborative approach that acknowledges both its opportunities
and challenges as “new governance”).
134. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 22 (describing the five features that
characterize “collaborative governance”); id. at 6 (characterizing a collaborative
administrative process as “a problem-solving exercise in which parties share
responsibility for all stages of the rule-making process”). Incidentally, where
this literature defines “collaboration,” the definition resembles my own. See, e.g.,
Jill Purdy, A Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative Governance
Processes, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 409, 409 (2012) (defining collaboration as a
“process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can
constructively explore their differences and search for solutions” (quoting
BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR MULTIPARTY
PROBLEMS 5 (1st ed. 1989)).
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about this body of literature is how it reconceives of these
processes and the relationships between agencies and firms
embodied in them. I will describe the details of this shift in
a moment. For now, note that one of its effects appears to be
what I was after above: a game of cooperation. As Orly
Lobel puts it, “[a] shift from adversarial legalism to
collaboration entails a move from an image of win-lose
situations to a win-win environment. All actors come to
realize their interlocking interest in the processes of
governance.”135
The
language
is
suggestive.
Administrative
collaboration promises to transform an adversarial
encounter in which agency and firm compete over
regulatory control into a collaborative one. To understand
how this might be, and the implications for moderate
departmentalism, I want to isolate two key ideas in the new
governance literature on collaborative decision-making. I
will use these ideas to compare administrative collaboration
to inter-branch constitutional interpretation under a regime
of moderate departmentalism.
1. Administrative Collaboration: Peers and NonCoercion. The first idea is that collaboration involves the
interaction of peers. Peers are equal in authority. Thus,
administrative collaboration takes place, the literature tells
us, within a “horizontal network[]” of public and private
entities, rather than a vertical hierarchy of authority
headed by the agency.136 The intended point of contrast is
with New Deal theories of public administration.137
135. Lobel, supra note 21, at 379; see also id. at 405-06 tbl.2; Salamon, supra
note 21, at 1633 (noting that in new governance “collaboration replaces
competition as the defining feature of sectoral relationships”).
136. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., The New Governance: Practices and
Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government,
65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547, 547 (2005) (“[H]orizontal networks of public, private,
and nonprofit organizations [constitute] the new structures of governance as
opposed to hierarchical organizational decision making.”); Lobel, supra note 21,
at 377.
137. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 21, at 270-72 (discussing the ineffectiveness
of the New Deal constitutionalism and the call for decentralization and
limitation of national authority); Freeman, supra note 21, at 3 (comparing,
generally, the contestation of administration to that present during the New
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Traditional theory conceived of government agencies as
possessing complete control over the operation of their
programs; thus, a major task of that body of theory was to
describe how control should be exercised to accomplish
program goals consistent with values of efficiency and
democratic legitimacy.138 In contrast, new governance
acknowledges that agencies have only partial control over
their programs.139 Agencies and firms are thus
interdependent in ways that blur the line between public
and private orders.140 For example, government agencies
depend on regulated entities and industry associations to
gather information and provide feedback on policy
effectiveness; regulated entities, in turn, depend on
government to provide a framework of rules and institutions
in which goods and services can profitably be delivered.141
But agency dependence on firms and other private
entities goes much deeper than this. Firms, industry
associations, and public interest groups are often the source
of the norms by which firm behavior is measured. In this
way, interdependence gives substance to the idea that
agencies and the firms they regulate are “peers.”142 Consider
Deal); Lobel, supra note 21, at 351-54 (discussing the regulatory development of
the New Deal and the emergence of a new paradigm).
138. See Salamon, supra note 21, at 1628-29 (discussing the shift “from
hierarchic agencies to organizational networks”).
139. See id.
140. See id. at 1631 (stating that, under the network theory, “the standard
relationship among actors is one of interdependence”); Dorf & Sabel, supra note
21, at 354-55 (discussing the dynamic of agencies, requiring them to be
interdependent, yet involved in the very interests they regulate); Fiorino, supra
note 21, at 452 (finding that the complexity of the problems and the level of
interdependence create a need for cooperation); Freeman, supra note 21, at 30
(discussing that collaboration will involve arrangements that cross the publicprivate divide).
141. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 21, at 317-19 (discussing the ongoing
exchange between agency and regulated entity results in agency learning and
collaborative development of rules); Salamon, supra note 21, at 1628-29, 1635
(discussing the need for strong governmental involvement in the private sector).
142. See Lobel, supra note 21, at 425-26 (“Under such a regime, public
authorities allow for cooperative implementation in which government relies
upon agents or employees of the regulated entities to help interpret, implement,
and enforce applicable rules.” (internal citation omitted)).
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the development and enforcement of administrative rules.
Regulated entities may be tasked with developing their own
company-specific rules that meet general benchmarks or
targets described by the agency.143 Such rules have the
benefit of being appropriately tailored to the circumstances
and business practices of the firm in question.144 Their
content does not seem “foreign,” misconceived, or unrealistic
to firm employees—who may, in fact, play a role in
developing the rules.145 Firms may also enforce rules
themselves using internal inspection procedures, backed by
governmental audit and sanction processes.146 Sharing
enforcement tasks may benefit all involved. Internal
inspectors often enjoy powers considerably greater than
government inspectors, and may be able to root out noncompliance behaviors hidden or obscure to an outside
observer.147
The second key idea is that collaboration is non-coercive.
Administrative collaboration requires both agency and firm
to employ the techniques of obtaining freely given consent:
negotiation and persuasion. The need for negotiation and
persuasion follows closely from agencies’ lack of complete
control over their regulatory programs, and their resulting
dependence on regulated entities. As Lester Salamon
describes the
connection,
“[g]iven the pervasive
interdependence that characterizes [horizontal] networks,
no entity . . . is in a position to enforce its will on the others
over the long run. In these circumstances, negotiation and
persuasion replace command and control as the preferred
management approach.”148 Simple examples again illustrate
the idea. Consider the task of gathering information from
regulated entities. Accessing and analyzing firm
143. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 106-08.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 110 (recognizing that rules can be simple and specific, rather
than having to account for an endless range of activities or strategies used
industry-wide).
146. See id. at 35-38 (discussing sanctions and compliance); Freeman, supra
note 21, at 30-31 (discussing a system of monitoring compliance internally).
147. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 104-05.
148. Salamon, supra note 21, at 1635 (emphasis omitted).
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information is vital to the rule-making, implementation,
and enforcement tasks. Yet government agencies lack the
resources to collect and fully understand much of this
information. As Ayres and Braithwaite report, even in cases
like nuclear regulation, “the facts of life are that the
wealthiest state in the world monitors only 1 or 2 percent of
‘safety-related’ activities at nuclear plants annually.”149 To
determine whether firms are complying with rules,
regulators must rely on the firms themselves, as well as
industry associations and public interest groups, to gather
and analyze relevant information. Agencies must negotiate
standards and protocols governing collection and access to
such information, and must persuade firms, their
associations, and key public interest groups to take an
active and comprehensive approach to informationmanagement tasks.
Nothing about this argument presupposes that
regulators will be able to negotiate favorable terms or
persuade firms to cooperate in every instance. This may
prove difficult, or in some cases impossible. I am unaware of
any new-governance scholars who assume that regulators
and firms will share a basic understanding of the purposes
of regulation or its relative importance, and will thus be
able to “deliberate” about best rules and how to enforce
them.150 Agencies are nonetheless often successful because
negotiation and persuasion are desirable strategies for all
involved. They are relatively non-invasive, and they are less
costly for both agency and firm than adversarial measures.
From the agency perspective, employing persuasion can
help to develop a culture of compliance at a firm. Ayres and
Braithwaite have shown that if regulators signal to firm
employees that they regard them as responsible, it
encourages employees to take a positive, public-regarding
approach to regulatory compliance, instead of a cynical
149. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 103 (citing Peter K.
Manning, The Limits of Knowledge: The Role of Information in Regulation, in
MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 49 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1989)).
150. See id. at 35-36; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 21, at 321-22 (noting that
collaboration can aid problem-solving deliberation); Lobel, supra note 21, at 311
(explaining how soft law allows for open communication and deliberation).
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one.151 From the firm perspective, such a culture promotes
lawful behavior. More broadly, the use of negotiation and
persuasion can encourage agency and firm to approach rulemaking and enforcement with a “problem-solving” attitude,
rather than an adversarial one—a result associated with
reduced costs.152
2. Comparing
Administrative
Collaboration
and
Moderate Departmentalism. Peer interdependence and noncoercion
suggest
a
natural
comparison
between
administrative collaboration and departmentalism. Interbranch constitutional interpretation under conditions of
moderate departmentalism exhibits both of these features.
First, it involves peer interactions. Equality of rank, or
branch coordinacy, was a premise in the argument above for
moderate departmentalism. Coordinacy, it was argued,
implies that each branch is free to exercise its powers as it
sees fit, and, by implication, that it may interpret the
content and scope of those powers. This autonomy—what
Corwin called “departmental autonomy”—implies that each
branch enjoys an imperfect control over constitutional
meaning.153 If the president has an implied authority to
determine for himself the meaning of “reasonable
suspicion,” then the Supreme Court lacks complete control
over the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the content of
the body of fundamental law governing police practices.
Similarly, a president who wishes to operate under a certain
construction of the Fourth Amendment depends on the
Supreme Court to affirm that construction in the context of
litigation. Just as in the administrative context, incomplete
control generates a kind of institutional “interdependence”
among the branches. Indeed, the implication was not lost on
the framers. As Paulsen has pointed out, James Wilson

151. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 47-51.
152. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 22-23; see, e.g., id. at 41-49
(demonstrating how the EPA used negotiation and persuasion in rulemaking).
153. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 59, at 21, 205, 469 n.19.
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drew much the same conclusion about the effects of
departmental independence on the president.154
Second, as a corollary, moderate departmentalism
necessitates the use of non-coercive techniques of obtaining
consent, particularly persuasion. The reasoning is much the
same as it was in the context of administrative regulation.
The president and the Court lack complete control over the
determination of constitutional meaning. Each has various
tools to encourage the other to adopt its favored
construction, but neither will able to force its view on the
other over the political long run.155 It appears, then, that
under a regime of moderate departmentalism, both the
president and the Court will need to engage in some amount
of persuasion to achieve goals that depend on interbranch
cooperation.156 Of course, efforts to persuade may or may not
be successful; the branches may go their own ways. I will
return to this point at length below. But when persuasion
does produce a shared solution, there is some reason to
expect the benefits of the “problem-solving” orientation
discussed above. A solution freely chosen by both
departments is likely to embody, to some degree, the
understanding and priorities of each, since each will have
had an opportunity to urge the merits of its view on the

154. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 239 (“Wilson
maintained that this independence of the departments would create a mutual
dependence (or inter-dependence), because, in the same way that each branch
would possess autonomous power within its sphere, none of the branches would
be bound by the ‘proceedings’ of the others.”). Viscount Bolingbroke also
advanced a similar argument. VILE, supra note 49, at 81 (“Bolingbroke then
presented a defence of his view that the independence of the parts of the
government . . . was perfectly compatable with their 'mutual dependency.' The
parts of the government have each the power to exercise some control over the
others, and they are therefore mutually dependent.").
155. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 77-78 (portraying the judiciary as
representative of outdated interests, giving a president with a mandate to
remake politics the upper hand); SKOWRONEK, supra note 97, at 27-28
(discussing the paradox that, for presidents, “the power to recreate order hinges
on the authority to repudiate it”).
156. I do not mean to rule out negotiation, but it seems likely that negotiation
between the Court and the other branches will almost always be tacit, due to
the norms governing judicial decision-making and judicial ethics more broadly.
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other, and to withhold approval until the proposed solution
reflects that perspective.157
In these respects, then, moderate departmentalism
resembles regulatory collaboration between agencies and
firms. The comparison is rather straightforward. The
Supreme Court resembles the government agency. Its
“program” is the determination of constitutional meaning.
Under a regime of moderate departmentalism, the Court
lacks complete control over this program. The president is a
regulated entity: he is subject to constitutional law. Since
the president has equal authority to determine
constitutional meaning, the Court must depend on him as a
source of constitutional norms. The Court cannot force the
president to adopt its own view of the law, at least over the
long run. It must thus obtain his freely-given consent,
principally by persuasion.
3. The Effect of Moderate Departmentalism on the
President. Consider, now, how these features of moderate
departmentalism affect the role of the executive in
constitutional litigation. Executive attorneys, of course,
currently play a significant role in constitutional litigation.
They contribute to the development, in litigation, of an
extensive written record reflecting the executive
understanding of the Constitution; they engage in repeated
face-to-face deliberations with judges, other governmental
actors, and private litigants concerning this understanding;
and they play a role in determining the agenda of
constitutional litigation before the Supreme Court.158
Moderate
departmentalism
enhances
this
already
significant
role.
Under
a
regime
of
moderate
departmentalism, the president is free to issue orders that
incorporate or ignore the Court’s determination of a point of
constitutional law. Because moderate departmentalism is
non-coercive in this way, it transforms the tone and function
157. See Fiorino, supra note 21, at 458-61 (describing “social learning”).
158. David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of
Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the
Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 245
(2009) (finding that when the Court calls for the views of the SG, it is thirtyseven times more likely to grant a cert petition).

2013]

COLLABORATIVE DEPARTMENTALISM

383

of the adjudicative proceedings in which the executive takes
part. The incentive of a court is to use such proceedings to
gather information from executive attorneys about the
president’s view of the law, and to persuade those attorneys
of the court’s own view. The cumulative effect is to make the
president’s participation in the interbranch constitutional
dialogue much more meaningful.
“Meaningful participation” transforms the relationship
between the president and the resultant constitutional
doctrine. To see this, consider again the basic analogy
between the president and stakeholders in collaborative
decision-making. The president is a stakeholder in the
determination of constitutional meaning. An interpretation
may limit presidential powers and make it considerably
more difficult for the president to achieve his agenda and
manage his political coalition. Such stakeholders, who have
considerable risk exposure, are more likely to abide by
decisions when they are made with their input. As Ayres
and Braithwaite report, “considerable evidence indicates
that participation in a decision-making process increases
the acceptance and improves the execution of the decisions
reached.”159 Jody Freeman explains the reasoning: “Giving
stakeholders an opportunity to participate directly in the
rule-making process grants them a degree of ‘ownership’
over a rule and increases their commitment to its successful
implementation.”160 Meaningful participation, in the
language of public administration, brings “buy in.”161
159. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 113 (citing Victor H. Vroom,
Industrial Social Psychology, in V THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 196268 (2d ed. 1969)).
160. Freeman, supra note 21, at 23-24 (citing Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private
Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 637, 658-60 (1976); see also id. at 27 (“Meaningful participation . . . gives
[affected parties] some responsibility for the regulatory regime.”); cf. Fiorino,
supra note 21, at 447-48 (describing the regime of “reflexive law,” which gives
regulated parties internal incentives to comply).
161. Of course, the point is not limited to studies of public administration but
is the basis of broader empirical research on adjudicative legitimacy. For an
influential defense of the significance of participation to the legitimacy of the
law, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94-104, 172-73 (1990)
(arguing that procedural justice is central to the legitimacy of adjudication).
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Participation is more likely to be “meaningful” when
process enables a party to make its voice heard, to directly
challenge competing views, and to object to the resulting
decision or even decline to implement it. In the context of
negotiated rulemaking, excessive assertions of authority by
agency officials may lead regulated entities to conclude that
negotiation is a sham, or “mere process,” and that the
agency will independently decide on the appropriate rule
itself.162 In this case, the president’s residual authority to act
on his own view of constitutional meaning suggests that a
rational Court will seriously consider his views, which in
turn encourages a greater investment by the president in
the process. If the view later announced by the Court
expressly reflects the president’s concerns as stated on the
record and in the public view, the president will have
greater reason to take “ownership” over that rule.
Consider the converse situation. A stakeholder with no
role in making a decision in which he has considerable
exposure is unlikely to abide by that conclusion over the
long run.163 This is especially the case where the excluded
party retains some discretion and has special expertise in
the regulated area; when a situation arises in which the
party believes that his interests (or overall social welfare)
would be advanced by ignoring the prior decision, he will
find little difficulty in concluding that the belief is
justified.164 The president, of course, can call on a number of
reasons for following such a course of action. The Court and
the Congress are unfamiliar with the demands of
162. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 37-40 (describing the process of
negotiated rulemaking under the federal Negotiated Rulemaking Act); id. at 2728 (“The administrative law landscape is littered with process reforms that have
failed to provide meaningful participation, particularly in environmental
decision making, because the responsible agency has reacted defensively to
them or because public input has had little discernible impact on the way in
which problems and solutions are conceived.”) (internal citation omitted).
163. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 23 & n.60.
164. See AYRES AND BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 104-05 (“While anyone
telling us how to do our job is a pain in the ass, interventions from ‘outsiders’
are harder to take.”); cf. Salamon, supra note 21, at 1635 (arguing that, under
the contemporary framework of administrative law, “no entity, including the
state, is in a position to enforce its will on the others over the long run”).
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suppressing rebellion and carrying out war, and largely
unequipped to manage such tasks.165 Where the stakes are
so high, the president may ignore or undermine a
determination of constitutional meaning that he regards as
inappropriate to his task.166
The logic is quite different if the president has
meaningfully participated in the process by which
constitutional meaning was settled. Suppose the question of
the balance of war powers between Articles I and II comes
before the federal courts. Executive attorneys appear in the
courts to articulate the president’s view. In the Supreme
Court, the Solicitor General describes the view and
responds to the concerns of the justices and other
stakeholders (perhaps Congress). The Court, aware that the
president may choose to go his own way, sensibly
incorporates his views into its opinion. This undermines the
basis cited above for the president to ignore the
constitutional determination of another branch. The
president can no longer complain that the rule was
fashioned without regard for the demands imposed by
armed conflict or other unique presidential responsibilities.
In this way, moderate departmentalism enhances the
authority of both the president and the Supreme Court over
the determination of constitutional meaning. Begin with the
president. Moderate departmentalism recognizes his
authority to refuse to adopt a constitutional interpretation
proffered by the Court. Since the president enjoys no such
authority under the current regime of judicial supremacy,
this represents an increase in authority. Now consider the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gives up the authority
to make final and supreme determinations of the meaning
165. The point is a common one. See, e.g., David Gray Adler, Foreign Policy
and the Separation of Powers: The Influence of the Judiciary, in JUDGING THE
CONSTITUTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 154, 172 (Michael W.
McCann & Gerald L. Houseman eds., 1989) [hereinafter Adler, Foreign Policy];
cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 92, at 10 (“When the hour of crisis tolls,
Congress has little incentive or capacity to enforce such attempted
precommitments.”).
166. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 19, at 73 (“If the political branches strongly
disagree with the [legally binding] judicial understanding, it will be ignored or
distinguished or limited to its facts.”).
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of the Constitution. Yet, at the same time, the Court’s
informal authority to pronounce constitutional rules is
increased, since the president’s participation gives him
reason to regard the Court’s announced rules as legitimate.
To the extent that this legitimacy is lacking under a regime
of judicial supremacy, this represents an increase in
authority for the Court. Thus the total amount of
interpretative authority is increased, rather than being
transferred from one department to another. What we have,
I suggest, is a model for understanding how coordinate
departments can decide together on the meaning of the
Constitution.
C. Agency Powers of Enforcement, and Other Complications
The comparison between administrative collaboration
and moderate departmentalism is suggestive. Yet it raises a
number of obvious questions. Consider, for example, the role
of the agency in new governance theory. Even though
agencies do not possess complete control over the operation
of their programs, they possess considerable authority, and
the use of this authority is essential, in a variety of ways, to
the success of administrative collaboration.167
To begin, agencies convene collaborative rulemaking
processes. For example, under the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act of 1990, which governs the negotiation of administrative
rules between agencies and stakeholders, the agency itself
determines when it is necessary to formulate a new
administrative rule.168 If the agency plans to negotiate the
rule with interested parties, it may appoint one of its own
officials as “convener,” a position tasked with determining
167. There are other complicating factors beyond agency powers. For example,
the framework of administrative law, which provides for judicial review of the
resulting administrative rule, establishes key boundaries on agency and firm
behavior. Public-interest groups are also key players and may prevent
cooperation from evolving into agency capture. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra
note 21, at 54-60.
168. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 563(a) (2006)
(“Determination of Need for Negotiated Rulemaking Committee”); see also
Freeman, supra note 21, at 38 (discussing the process behind formulating a new
rule).
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who should be invited to participate in the negotiation.169
After consulting with regulated entities, industry groups,
public interest groups, and various other entities, the
convener establishes an agenda for negotiation.170 These
controls give the agency tremendous influence over the
content and tone of the negotiation—factors essential to
successful collaboration.171 As one might expect, it also falls
to agency officials to facilitate deliberations by encouraging
stakeholders to actively participate and to invest in the
process.172 Agencies also provide the forum within which
collaboration can take place. This means at least a physical
setting where parties can meet and deliberate, face-to-face,
over an extended period of time. The point is not a
superficial one; research supports the conclusion that
extended face-to-face interaction encourages parties to take
a cooperative, problem-solving stance towards dispute
resolution, whereas the exchange of a paper record is
associated with excessively adversarial behavior and
posturing.173
It is in enforcement, however, that government agencies
play their most important role. This point is not lost on new
governance scholars, despite their well-known support of
self-enforcement processes.174 Ayres and Braithwaite
observe “a long history of barren disputation” between those
169. 5 U.S.C. § 563(b); Freeman, supra note 21, at 38 (citing NEGOTIATED
RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 123-31 (David M. Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds.,
1995)).
170. Freeman, supra note 21, at 38.
171. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 134, at 411.
172. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 37-38.
173. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 91 (“Empirically, there can
be no doubt that dialogue transforms the nature of regulatory encounters.”);
Freeman, supra note 21, at 22-24; Lobel, supra note 21, at 383; see also Chris
Huxham & Siv Vangen, Leadership in the Shaping and Implementation of
Collaboration Agendas: How Things Happen in a (Not Quite) Joined-Up World,
2000 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1159, 1170-71 (2000) (noting the effect of face-to-face
contact on environmental partnership).
174. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 19-53 (discussing the
importance of strong punishment to promote self-enforcement); Freeman, supra
note 21, at 32.; cf. Fiorino, supra note 21, at 456 (explaining the need for agency
independence).
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who—unlike themselves—believe that “gentle persuasion
works in securing business compliance with the law,” and
those who—also unlike themselves—treat firms like bad
actors and expect their compliance “only when confronted
with tough sanctions.”175 The new governance strategy is to
transcend this debate by describing enforcement processes
that mix strategies of persuasion and sanction.176 Thus,
according to Ayres and Braithwaite, building on work by
John Scholz, agencies should employ a tit-for-tat
enforcement strategy in which firm non-compliance is met
with an escalating series of sanctions, graded appropriately
to the severity and degree of noncompliance.177 The
concomitant distribution of enforcement practices can be
represented as a layered “enforcement pyramid”: at the base
of the pyramid, the thickest layer (and thus the activity
most often engaged in) is persuasion, on top of which lie
successively smaller layers of increasingly severe
sanctions.178 Instrumental to the solution is the existence, at
the very top of the pyramid, of a “benign big gun.” The big
gun is an “enormous” agency power, such as the ability to
revoke a firm license or shutter a business.179 Although
empirical studies suggest that agencies rarely use big guns
(thus they are “benign”), the existence of such a power
affects other, lesser agency powers.180 According to Ayres
and Braithwaite, the greater the sanction available to an
agency, the more the agency will be able to “push regulation
down to the cooperative base of the [enforcement] pyramid,”
and thus employ enforcement strategies like persuasion.181
Indeed, some kind of significant sanction is necessary if
firms are to consistently adopt a public-regarding approach
175. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 20.
176. Id. at 21.
177. Id. at 20-21, 35-40. Tit-for-tat is a strategy in an iterated game, in which
a player initially cooperates, but then defects if the other player defects. See
John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 LAW &
POL’Y 385, 392-93 (1984).
178. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 35-36.
179. Id. at 40.
180. Id. at 40-41.
181. Id. at 40-44.
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to regulatory enforcement, rather than a narrowly selfinterested one: “[W]ithout the spectre of sanctions in the
background, . . . social responsibility concerns would not
occupy the foreground of our deliberation.”182
These differences threaten to undermine the very
simple comparison drawn above between administrative
collaboration and moderate departmentalism. Specifically,
the absence of a judicial “big gun” suggests that, under a
regime of moderate departmentalism, the president has
little reason to abide by rules announced by the Court if
they do not advance his interests. It is to this objection that
I turn in the remainder of this Article. My strategy will be
to argue that, despite the differences canvassed above, the
Supreme Court does have a kind of judicial “big gun.”
Avoiding this sanction encourages the president to
participate with the Court in constitutional interpretation
and to comply with its results.
D. The Rationality of Constitutional Collaboration
We can begin to consider why, under moderate
departmentalism, the president would adopt an unfriendly
constitutional rule by drawing on a body of scholarship that
considers why political actors ever voluntarily comply with
adjudication.183 It is usually supposed that political actors
comply with the exercise of judicial power because they
respect formal constitutional and statutory boundaries. But
182. Id. at 47.
183. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 12; Graber, Establishing Judicial
Review?, supra note 30; Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 30;
David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723
(2009); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1975); Levinson, Parchment
and Politics, supra note 102, at 658, 661; McAdams, supra note 116, at 239-41,
248-49; Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1043 (2005) [hereinafter McAdams, Expressive power of
Adjudication]; J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A
Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994); Matthew C. Stephenson,
“When the Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial
Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 62-63 (2003); Barry R. Weingast, The Political
Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245
(1997).
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a little reflection suggests the answer is incomplete.184 For it
is not obvious why powerful political actors would obey
formal legal boundaries when doing so handicaps them. The
judiciary cannot compel their obedience; it is the political
actors who control the powers of sanction. As Matthew
Stephenson put it in a now oft-quoted line, “[w]hy would
people with money and guns ever submit to people armed
only with gavels?”185
The answer proposed by this line of scholarship is that
obeying formal constitutional boundaries actually benefits
political actors. Compliance enables political actors to
advance their agenda—for example, by achieving a policy
result or satisfying the demands of a lobbyist or coalition
member. Recall Keith Whittington’s argument that a
president might transfer interpretative authority back to
the judiciary to avoid blame for resolving a politically
divisive issue.186 Delegation thus advances, not harms, the
interests of political actors; it allows them to preserve their
own popularity and prevent the fracture of their political
coalition.187
Other arguments make use of the logic of coordination.
For example, building on an earlier model described by
Barry Weingast, David Law has recently argued that
judicial review solves a coordination problem associated
with the popular control of governmental actors.188
Coordination problems are what I called above “non-zerosum” games of strategy; they are games in which both
players stand to benefit if they can settle on the right
combination of moves. According to Law, all forms of
representative constitutional government pose such a

184. For a recent account of the explanatory deficit, see Levinson, Parchment
and Politics, supra note 102, at 659-61.
185. Stephenson, supra note 183, at 60.
186. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, and accompanying text.
187. See Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 30, at 37-45;
Stephenson, supra note 183, at 62-63.
188. See Law, supra note 183, at 723; see also Weingast, supra note 183, at
246-52.
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problem.189 The interests of political actors diverge from the
interests of citizens, and this divergence can lead political
actors to exceed or abuse their grants of power. Yet a citizen
who tries on his own to enforce constitutional boundaries
against the government is likely to pay a very high cost for
doing so (and be unsuccessful), while working together will
produce success at much lower a cost.190 This suggests that
individuals will resist unconstitutional action only if they
expect other individuals to resist, and expect that other
individuals expect the same of them. Judicial decisions
create such expectations by “generating common beliefs and
common knowledge about both the constitutionality of
government conduct and the ways in which other citizens
will react.”191 Courts thus enable citizens to coordinate their
responses to governmental action.192
These ideas pose two important questions for my
defense of moderate departmentalism: (1) Does moderate
departmentalism provide the president any strategic
reasons to comply with constitutional rules announced by
the Supreme Court, even if they are unfriendly? If so, then
we can answer the skepticism, expressed above, that the
president would ever comply with such rules. (2) Does
moderate departmentalism interfere with the strategic
benefits associated with judicial review under a regime of
judicial supremacy? In other words, is judicial supremacy
an assumption in the accounts offered by Whittington,
Graber, Law, Weingast, and others?

189. See Law, supra note 183, at 730-31 (citing Martin Shapiro, The Success of
Judicial Review and Democracy, in MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON
LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 149, 182 (2002)).
190. See Weingast, supra note 183, at 247-48.
191. Law, supra note 183, at 732; cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 999 (2008) [hereinafter
Posner & Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns]; David A. Strauss, Common
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 910-19 (1996). More
specifically, court judgments create a “focal point” by signaling the existence of a
constitutional violation.
192. For other examples of this kind of argument, see Levinson, Parchment
and Politics, supra note 102, at 708-10, and McAdams, Expressive Power of
Adjudication, supra note, 183, at 1074-80.
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It is to these questions that I turn below. In taking up
these issues, I do not assume that the logic described in the
previous Part—the president’s meaningful participation in
the determination of constitutional meaning—is insufficient
to explain his voluntarily compliance with constitutional
rules announced by the Supreme Court. Indeed, I argued
above that, as an empirical matter, meaningful
participation in the formulation of a rule makes it more
likely that one will freely comply with it.193 This is the case
even when resultant rules come at significant cost to the
actor in question.194 Yet this cannot, and should not, be the
whole of the case for moderate departmentalism. As Ayres
and Braithwaite have persuasively argued, the best
regulatory enforcement strategies are dynamic; they
recognize that a plurality of considerations influence
individual decisions—legal, moral, and strategic—and adapt
in response to individual choices.195 Firm leaders, the
authors suggest, have “multiple selves”: they are profitmaximizers, perfectionists about their products or services,
law-abiders, and so on.196 We hope that firm personnel will
respond to regulators with their best, most public-regarding
selves—but we know it may not come to pass. I assume that
presidents are much the same, and, thus, that moderate
departmentalism must support a dynamic strategy of
“constitutional enforcement.” It must be prepared for the
multiple selves of the modern American president.
1. Strategic
Compliance
Under
Moderate
Departmentalism. It has long been understood that the logic
of repeat play is central to voluntary compliance with the
193. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 113.
194. See Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain
Official Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 759, 780-81 (2010); cf. TYLER, supra note 161, at
94-105.
195. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 35-47.
196. See id. at 19-20; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503,
1519 (2000) (“Individuals have multiple conflicting identities, both collective and
individual. Sometimes individual members of a group act in accordance with a
decision frame in which they regard themselves as ‘I’s rather than as ‘we.’ . . .
[W]e observe far more cooperation and successful collective action than can be
explained by rational choice theory.”).
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law.197 In 1984, John Scholz modeled what he called the
“enforcement dilemma” as a prisoners’ dilemma-type game
between regulators and firms. The game works as follows.
Regulator and firm are each given the choice of cooperating
or defecting. In the case of the regulator, defection means
“harassing” the firm; and in the case of the firm, it means
evading the regulator.198 Payoffs in the game follow the
distribution of the prisoners’ dilemma. The firm pays the
highest compliance costs if it cooperates but the regulator
harasses; and the lowest costs if it evades and the regulator
cooperates. The regulator obtains the least pollution
reduction (for example) if it cooperates but the firm evades;
and the greatest reduction if it harasses and the firm
cooperates. This distribution, of course, makes mutual
cooperation impossible. The firm’s best strategy (for
reducing costs) is to evade, whatever the regulator does; and
the regulator’s best strategy (for reducing pollution) is to
harass, whatever the firm does. The equilibrium is thus
harassment and evasion. Meanwhile, the optimal strategy—
mutual cooperation—is impossible, at least on the
assumptions of the game.199
All this is changed by repeat play. Repeat play requires
one to consider the prospect of future payoffs. Since players
in future rounds may consider the choices made now, one’s
present choice can affect future payoffs. Thus, future
payoffs matter to rational actors’ present choices. If the
present value of future cooperative payoffs is higher than
the firm’s payoff from evading in the present round, then it
will be rational for the firm to cooperate. Indeed, it can be
demonstrated that if the agency adopts a reciprocal
strategy, such as tit-for-tat (cooperate as long as the other
197. See, e.g., Scholz, supra note 177. For an example in the separation of
powers context, see Ramseyer, supra note 183, at 722.
198. More precisely, Scholz called the evasion payoff for the firm “temptation,”
see Scholz, supra note 177, at 389, but “temptation” is a term sometimes used to
refer to any defection strategy associated with a high individual payoff. I
therefore use the term “evasion,” which naturally calls to mind a familiar firm
behavior in the face of regulation.
199. See id. at 390; see also McAdams, supra note 116, at 215-16. One of the
assumptions of the game is that each player will act rationally, given their
interests. In an actual encounter, of course, this may not be the case.
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player does), a firm can guarantee itself a higher long-term
payoff by cooperating every round than by using any
strategy involving evasion.200 In this way, repeated
interactions make voluntary cooperation possible.
We can use the idea of repeat play to show why it is
rational, under a system of moderate departmentalism, for
the president to voluntarily comply with unfriendly
constitutional rules. Suppose the president meaningfully
participates in an interbranch process of constitutional
interpretation, as described above, and that the Court
announces a constitutional rule unfriendly to his interests.
Suppose further the president’s participation in the process
does not lead him to adopt the Court’s view. Even so—even
where the president is, on balance, unmoved by his
participation in the interpretative process—he must still
consider the prospect of future interbranch relations.
Voluntarily complying with a constitutional rule announced
by the Supreme Court will affect the president’s future
interactions with the Court, the Congress, and the people,
and will affect the benefits he can hope to obtain from these
future interactions.
The core idea can be developed in a number of ways, but
here are two specific future consequences that a rational
president will consider. First, ignoring the Supreme Court
may produce a higher-order conflict the president will lose.
Simply ignoring an opinion of the Supreme Court is likely to
generate litigation, which could result in an order from a
federal court reflecting the Supreme Court’s previously
expressed views. Ignoring that order would touch off a
higher-order dispute about the presidential power to ignore
valid court orders—a dispute in which the president is
unlikely to prevail. As I will explain below, the shift to the
higher-order dispute reproduces something like the dynamic
of Ayres and Braithwaite’s “enforcement pyramid.” Second,
200. See Scholz, supra note 177, at 392-93. Certain conditions must obtain.
Principally, the value of the future cooperative payoffs must exceed the value of
the present payoff associated with harassment or evasion. See id. at 392. The
game must also continue indefinitely. See RAPOPORT, supra note 116, at 131-32.
And there must be no ambiguity about what counts as cooperation. See
Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 102, at 685.
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even if the matter on which the Court announces an
unfriendly rule is crucially important to the president, he
may ultimately gain by voluntarily accepting the
construction of the Court. In a political regime where
legitimacy can enhance constitutional authority, engaging
in deliberation and freely complying with its results can
enhance the reputational authority of the complying actor.
It thus makes future benefits possible that might be
impossible otherwise.
a. Higher-Order Conflict. Imagine the following case.
The president interprets a statute authorizing indefinite
military detentions of enemy combatants as impliedly
suspending the writ of habeas corpus.201 The statute
provides for an administrative determination of combatant
status, but no opportunity to subsequently challenge the
determination by presenting evidence or confronting
witnesses. After the president announces his view, an
enemy combatant held pursuant to the law petitions a
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging
his detention. The district court denies the petition and the
denial is upheld on appeal, but the Supreme Court reverses
the decision, holding that the statute in question did not
suspend habeas, and that the combatants are entitled to a
more extensive legal process for challenging the status
determination. On remand, the district court grants the
petition and executive officers comply with the court’s
orders.
Now imagine that the president refuses to comply with
future court orders based on the Supreme Court’s decision,
citing his disagreement with the Court’s construction of the
statute, constitutional law, and the crucial national
interests at stake.202 Consider the president’s options in
such a case. If a district court issues a writ of habeas
corpus, the president may appeal the order, but he is likely
to lose in the court of appeals, which is bound by the same
precedent as the district court. He may then seek a writ of
201. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (discussing a similar set of
facts).
202. See Easterbrook, supra note 31, at 926 & n.57 (acknowledging this
possibility).
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certiorari from the Supreme Court, but given the Court’s
recent determination of the issue, the writ is unlikely to be
granted.203 If the president refuses to enforce the habeas
writ on remand from the court of appeals, the petitioner will
ask the district court to enforce it.
At this point, the picture doesn’t look good for the
president. Absent extraordinary political circumstances, it
seems unlikely that the president will be able to simply
refuse the orders of the district court to enforce the writ.
Crucially, the issue at this point becomes entirely general:
the question is whether the president has the duty to
execute valid orders with which he disagrees. Nearly all
scholars of presidential power agree that he has such an
obligation.204 Moreover, even if the president were to succeed
in persuading the Supreme Court to issue a writ of
certiorari, he would be faced with the task of persuading the
Court to give up a rule it had, ex hypothesi, only just
announced. Without a strong reason for urging the Court to
reverse itself, he is unlikely to succeed.205 If he knows he is
unlikely to succeed, he is unlikely to try.206
This is what I call the case of higher-order conflict.
Where the president’s interpretation of the Constitution can
give rise to litigation, simply ignoring a recent decision of
203. A “straight deny” would be most likely. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (explaining
none of the criteria for certiorari would exist in a suit concerning an issue that
has just been resolved by the Court). But see Gregory A. Caldeira & John R.
Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1115 (1988) (when federal government petitions, cert is
“significantly more likely”); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court
Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 750-51 (2001) (finding a
positive correlation between grant of cert and the import of the issue in the case,
such as “‘core’ governmental powers”).
204. Post & Siegel, supra note 16, at 1033.
205. In this respect, Barry Friedman’s account of the “constitutional dialogue”
that followed Roe v. Wade feels somewhat forced; for surely, under a regime of
judicial supremacy, the dialogue would not have permitted Congress to reject
the reasoning of the Supreme Court, as President Reagan in fact urged it to do.
See Friedman, supra note 18, at 661-68. To be sure, even under a regime of
departmentalism, the states would not be authorized to disregard a decision of
the Supreme Court—I am not defending nullification or “state review.”
206. Cf. Posner & Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, supra note 191, at
1009.
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the Supreme Court is likely to result in litigation the
president will lose. The president will then be tasked with
making the general case that he can ignore court orders,
and this will be extremely difficult to do. Given this array of
options, the president is unlikely to ignore the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution where doing so
creates a justiciable case or controversy. It risks creating a
higher-order conflict he cannot win.
One response to my argument might be the following:
“Even if you are right about this, I don’t see the advantage
over judicial supremacy with respect to limiting the exercise
of executive power. Isn’t the result just the same? Isn’t the
president already required to abide by the Court’s view of
the Constitution? You would just be creating more
litigation, which is the last thing we need. We’d also be left
with many more judicial opinions to make sense of. In fact,
wouldn’t the result be a kind of ‘pointillist’ body of
precedent governing executive power?207 How is that
desirable?”
It is indeed correct that departmentalism of the variety
I defend here is not far from judicial supremacy. As long as
we keep intact the general obligation for the president to
comply with valid legal judgments, we will not end up with
an executive branch bound only by political forces.208 But
this is a strength of the account, not a weakness. It shows
that moderate departmentalism is hardly a radical position.
Moreover, my opponent’s response is incorrect in the
following sense: there is a beneficial difference between the
departmentalism described above and a regime of judicial
supremacy. The difference is easiest to see if we focus on the
question of when the president is likely to seek, and likely
to obtain, a writ of certiorari in a case putatively governed
by a recent decision of the Supreme Court. The president
will be likely to seek a writ, and likely to obtain it, if he can
convince the Court that they were mistaken, for some
reason, about their recent construction of the Constitution.
The easiest way to succeed in this effort is surely to show
207. The analogy is due to Post & Siegel, supra note 16, at 1040-41.
208. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 92, at 3-18.
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the Court that it has been factually mistaken about a matter
of executive power—not that the Court has been legally
mistaken, since the Court is (and regards itself as being)
highly conversant in the governing law and is therefore
unlikely to abandon a construction so soon after announcing
it. In contrast, a focus on factual mistake advantages the
executive where the matter lies within its expertise, such as
the conduct of foreign relations, hostilities, or the execution
of the law. After all, the Court has, of its own avail,
developed a body of law limiting its ability to hear cases on
such questions in light of, among other things, a purported
lack of competence.209 The president is thus incentivized to
seek review of a recent decision by the Court where, in light
of his office, he can provide critical insight on the Court’s
construction of the law—for example, by drawing on a
feature of the conduct of hostilities overlooked or distorted
by the Court. In this way, departmentalism incentivizes the
president to act on his own views of the Constitution when
he has strong, objective reasons to think the Court is
mistaken on a matter within his bailiwick.210
Where the president judges that he will be unable to
prevail in either litigation over the underlying substantive
issue or a collateral enforcement proceeding, he will be
unlikely to simply ignore the recently announced view of the
Supreme Court. There is no reason to suppose a president
with finite resources and a limited political “warrant” will
seek out higher-order conflicts he is unable to win.211 And
surely he will be unable to win in most cases—which is to
say, surely, in most cases, the president will be without a
convincing, objective argument that (1) the Supreme Court’s
209. See Adler, Foreign Policy, supra note 165, at 168-70.
210. In this way, moderate departmentalism would effect an executive version
of the “judicial second-look” doctrine described by Neil Katyal. See Katyal, supra
note 17, at 1359-60.
211. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 18-21 (describing the
presidential task of achieving imperatives in the face of a variety of significant
constraints). Note that the president’s political warrant is limited in more
dimensions than quantity; as Skowronek has explained, the president’s
warrant, or authority, is premised on a particular relationship to the extant
regime. Warrants are thus imbued with a particular message. Certain messages
make it difficult for the president to broadly contest the authority of the courts.
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articulation of the law reflects a factual mistake about a
matter within his executive expertise; or, (2) even if the
Court did not clearly make a mistake, it should not interfere
with the president for some more general reason. The
implication is that the president will freely comply with the
Court’s view in most cases. This is why a “pointillist” body
of law will not evolve.
In this way, repeat play transforms the logic of the
president’s decision about whether to comply with an
unfriendly constitutional rule announced by the Supreme
Court. Where the Court’s views bind lower courts (“vertical”
stare decisis), the president can count on repeated litigation
if he ignores the Court’s view. Such litigation imposes costs
on the president. A rational President will consider the
avoidance of future costs in presently deciding whether to
voluntarily comply. Moreover, there is a dynamic quality to
the encounter between the president and the courts, since
repeated litigation potentially transforms the nature and
significance of the dispute. The longer the president insists
on refusing to comply with the rule announced by the Court,
the greater the possibility that the dispute transforms into
one in which the president appears to challenge judicial
power simpliciter. Such a conflict will impose significant
political costs on the president. Perhaps the best known
example of this result is the political effect of Roosevelt’s
court-packing plan,212 but more recent presidents have also
mismanaged disagreements with the Court, causing them to
metastasize.213 Moreover, higher-order disputes tend to give
rise to broader and deeper exercises of the judicial power.
Courts can change the scope of the orders they enter.
Compare the judicial order resolving initial litigation, which
concerns the parties and the subject matter of their dispute,
with the judicial order in a higher-order dispute, which
212. See Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?,
2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 130-32 (2010).
213. Consider, for example, the costs suffered by President George W. Bush in
repeated conflicts with the courts over the rights of those detained during the
so-called “war on terror.” See Johnsen, supra note 8, at 395 (“President George
W. Bush and his executive branch lawyers have earned widespread and often
scathing criticism for their extreme positions and practices regarding the scope
of presidential authority.”).
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concerns the very exercise of executive power and may
affect executive officers beyond those involved in the initial
litigation. In this way, “vertical” stare decisis transforms
specific disputes into more general ones.
What we have before us, I argue, is the “big gun” of the
judiciary under a regime of moderate departmentalism.
Because a rational president will avoid higher-order
conflicts, the big gun is likely to be “benign,” just as it was
in the regulatory context.214 Avoiding such conflicts
incentivizes the president to comply even with unfriendly
constitutional rules announced by the Court. 215 The
regulatory logic thus plays out to the same effect: the
existence of the big gun incentives the president to
voluntarily adopt the Court’s constitutional rule, creating a
kind of “enforcement pyramid,” in which the more severe
sanctions are relatively rare, and most “enforcement” takes
place through “persuasion” (the voluntary adoption of the
Court’s interpretation).
b. The Appearance of Legitimacy. We are considering
the effect of repeat play on the president’s voluntary
compliance with unfriendly constitutional rules. We have
seen how the present value of future conflicts affects the
president’s choice of whether to comply. There is a second
mechanism, as well, through which repeat play can affect
the president’s present choice: reputation.
As I am using it here, the logic of reputation is
concerned with repeated games involving different
partners.216 Recall Scholz’s “enforcement dilemma” described
above. Imagine now that the game repeats, but that
multiple firms are involved. In the first game, the regulator
must choose whether to cooperate or harass, and the firm
must choose whether to cooperate or evade. In the second
round, a second firm must choose whether to cooperate or
214. See supra notes 187-89, and accompanying text.
215. See discussion supra Part II.C and accompanying notes.
216. With some modification, I am following the development of this idea in
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 106 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds.,
1990).
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evade; and in the third round, a third firm; and so on. To
say that we are dealing with a repeated game, rather than a
series of discrete games, is to say that each firm has
knowledge of how the regulator treated previous firms.
Imagine, now, that each firm employs the following
strategy: cooperate with the regulator if it has a perfect track
record of cooperating, and otherwise evade. If we suppose
that the regulator begins with perfect track record—a
perfect “reputation,” if you will—then the first firm will
cooperate rather than evade. The regulator will cooperate if
the present value of future cooperation is sufficiently high.
Reputation thus makes it possible to sustain a strategy of
mutual cooperation between the regulator and different
firms.217
Now consider the effect of the president’s reputation on
his interaction with the Supreme Court.218 As Daryl
Levinson has recently observed, reputation gives political
actors a reason to comply with formal constitutional
constraints.219 Here the idea is slightly different, since by
assumption the president is authorized to reject
constitutional interpretations advanced by the Court.
Nevertheless, where the president engages the Court in
public argument about the meaning of the Constitution, but
the Court is generally thought to have of the better
argument, he violates a norm of constitutional government if
he nonetheless refuses to voluntarily comply.220 This
imposes a reputational cost.
217. See id. Note we need not assume that a regulatory agency is controlled by
the same personnel over the course of repeated games. See id. at 108-11
(detailing reputation and multiple ownership of a business firm).
218. The case of the president is significantly different from the example. We
have been analogizing the president to the firm, not the regulator. So we are not
dealing with a multiple-firm repeated game. Rather, we are contemplating that
there is one firm that will, in effect, play repeated games with a variety of
entities, and that those entities will be aware of the firm’s reputation from its
games with the regulator.
219. Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 102, at 685, 711.
220. I have deliberately not specified who is judging the Court to have
prevailed in argument against the president. Fill in whom you like. Perhaps it is
“the people,” “the elites,” or “other governmental actors.” I don’t think the choice
matters much here.

402

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

Let me elaborate. I begin with a basic idea: in our
political system, prevailing in free deliberation among
equals enhances the legitimacy of one’s actions. This is not
to say that political legitimacy depends on the ability to
prevail in free deliberation; legitimacy presumably turns on
many factors. The relative weighting of those factors may be
context-dependent or tiered in some way. (In some cases, I
imagine, the loser in free deliberation may enjoy a greater
political legitimacy than his opponent.) Nor is this to say
that prevailing in free deliberation constitutes, or creates,
political legitimacy. In my usage, legitimacy is not a binary
value but an indefinite one. Prevailing in deliberation
enhances legitimacy in the sense that it increases the
measure of propriety associated with the governmental
action subject to debate. That, more or less, is all I want to
assume.
In a regime where this is true—where prevailing in free
deliberation among equals enhances political legitimacy—
there are reasons to freely comply with the perceived results
of a deliberative exchange, even if one does not prevail. This
is a result of the enhanced legitimacy enjoyed by the
prevailing opponent. If prevailing in deliberation enhances
legitimacy, complying with the course of conduct defended
by the prevailing party permits the complying party to
share in the enhanced legitimacy. Since he acts just as the
prevailing party suggested, the complier enjoys the
increased measure of propriety won by prevailing party.
This encourages opposed political actors to seek out
deliberative exchange as a means of resolving legal
disagreements, since they have an expectation that
participants will bind themselves according to the results.221
The president thus can increase the likelihood of systemic
cooperation by publicly, clearly, and voluntarily complying
with unfriendly rules announced by the Supreme Court.
Conversely, when the president refuses to abide by a
prevailing constitutional rule, it discourages other political
actors from seeking out future deliberative exchanges. His

221. See Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 102 (applying similar
logic to explain compliance with electoral outcomes by the loser).
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tarnished outcome forecloses future beneficial outcomes
that depend on mutual cooperation.
We can refine this argument by contrasting the
reputational benefits of voluntary compliance with the nowfamiliar technique of blame avoidance, as practiced under a
regime of judicial supremacy.222 Blame avoidance is a tactic
of Skowronek’s “affiliated” president, who attempts to
preserve his political coalition by relegating divisive issues
to the Supreme Court.223 Litigation is brought to the Court,
the Court weighs in, and the president declares he is bound
by its holding—whatever his personal beliefs on the matter
happen to be. The best example of the tactic, at least in
recent memory, is abortion.224 But as the example suggests,
the technique is rarely successful, at least over the long run.
The Court’s ability to resolve highly charged issues—issues
that truly divide the public and the governing coalition—is
limited. It has no special ability to broker political
compromises. Its decision inflames the losers, who have a
strong incentive to charge the Court with politicking,
thereby recalling the issue to the arena of political
dispute.225 (Their case, moreover, is strong.) At the same
time, the Court incurs reputational costs by attempting to
resolve a highly charged matter using the blunderbuss
techniques of legal reasoning.226
For its part, departmentalism limits the president’s
ability to engage in blame avoidance. A president with equal
authority to interpret the Constitution cannot claim to have
his hands tied by the Court’s determination of
constitutional meaning. Executive interpretations of the
Constitution are “traceable” to the president. There are
obvious advantages to this state of affairs. First, it permits
222. See, e.g., Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 30, at 37-45.
223. SKOWRONEK, supra note 97; see discussion supra Part II.A.
224. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 66-67; Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty, supra note 30, at 40.
225. See, e.g., BURT, supra note 18, at
Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 30, at 42.

33,

353-54;

Graber,

The

226. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 69-70 (describing the politicization of
the judiciary by a reconstructive president).
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the public to determine more easily who is accountable for a
specific government policy. Second, it lowers the
reputational costs to the Court associated with an attempt
to resolve a politically divisive issue using the techniques of
legal reasoning. This is because, once blame avoidance is
undermined, fewer such issues will be relegated to the
Court; and because the Court’s decision will have a much
narrower impact—the Court won’t be capable of resolving
the issue entirely.
A third advantage is that departmentalism leaves the
president with those avoidance techniques whose effects are
more salutary and encourage him to genuinely engage the
issue at hand. Consider how the president might go about
adopting the Supreme Court’s resolution of a divisive issue.
He cannot claim his hands are tied. Rather, he has two
options. The president must either defend the Court’s
supremacy to determine this particular constitutional
rule—say, because it pertains to a matter uniquely within
the Court’s expertise, such as a rule of legal procedure or a
protection afforded criminal defendants in the courtroom—
or, he must adopt the Court’s view as his own by defending
the view on its merits. In doing the former, the president is
still attempting to place responsibility for governmental
conduct on a divisive issue with the Court; but he does so
freely, because it properly belongs with the Court as the
institution of government best suited to resolve the issue.
Moreover, the president cannot simply assert this; he will
have to defend the assertion, since political opponents will
disagree that the matter was best resolved by the Court.
Where the president chooses instead to defend the Court’s
view on its merits, he must embrace the substance of the
view as his own, and in doing so he can claim the strategic
advantages of complying with the rule of law. Where he
chooses to disagree, he must best the Court on its terms,
and face the political consequences of staking out his own
position.
By
controlling
blame
avoidance,
moderate
departmentalism increases the accountability of the
president and places greater emphasis on the interbranch
interpretative process. Giving this process pride of place
further increases the president’s stake in constitutional
collaboration, and thus the future benefits available with an
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untarnished reputation. Thus there is something like a
feedback effect.
2. Strategic Compliance Under Judicial Supremacy.
Preventing higher-order conflict and preserving a positive
reputation are two reasons the president should voluntarily
comply with unfriendly constitutional rules. They are
“strategic
benefits,”
as
it
were,
of
moderate
departmentalism. But what about the costs? Are there
strategic reasons to comply with judicial rulings unique to a
regime of judicial supremacy? Of course, judicial supremacy
supposes that the president is already obligated to adopt the
constitutional rules announced by the Supreme Court, since
the Court is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning.
Yet as we have seen, it is puzzling why powerful political
actors would comply with such rules, given the actors’
monopoly over governmental force.
It seems clear that moderate departmentalism would
affect the current logic of voluntary compliance, but how it
would do so is not entirely clear. Some strategic
considerations would be unaffected; not all of the work on
voluntary compliance with the exercise of judicial power is
premised on judicial supremacy. For example, drawing on
work by Mark Ramseyer and Barry Weingast, Matthew
Stephenson argues that parties comply with judicial review
because it allows them to reduce risks associated with
political competition.227 In particular, argues Stephenson,
judicial review requires the party in power to sacrifice some
policy objectives, which is presently beneficial to that party
because it will lose power in some future period.228 Note that
the assumption of political competitiveness alone does not
support judicial review. Ideally, political parties in a
competitive system could simply agree to exercise a degree
of constraint when in power.229 Parties could then employ a
reciprocal strategy, like those outlined in the repeated
games above, in order to sustain the mutual restraint of
227. Stephenson, supra note 183, at 63-64; see also Ramseyer, supra note 183,
at 739-40; Weingast, supra note 183, at 246.
228. Stephenson, supra note 183, at 63-64.
229. See Stephenson, supra note 183, at 68.
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power. However, in Stephenson’s model, the signals sent by
the parties in power are “noisy,” which is to say, they are
equivocal between cooperation and non-cooperation, from
the perspective of the party out of power.230 The party out of
power thus does not know whether it should behave noncooperatively in the next round. A third-party signal
correlated with the actual behavior of the party in power
enables the parties to coordinate.231 The third party, of
course, is the independent judiciary.
Nothing in the model supposes that the political parties
are obligated to adopt the judiciary’s view of the law.
Stephenson is explicit about this. His model envisions only a
judicial declaration of the legality or illegality of
government policy. The government is not bound by the
declaration. As Stephenson puts it, “[T]he judiciary does not
have the power to ‘veto’ a government policy on grounds of
illegality. All the judiciary can do is make a declaration of
illegality. The government can choose to modify its policy . .
. , but it need not.”232 Conceptually, it is relatively easy see
why this should be so. The judiciary’s only role in
Stephenson’s model is to send a public signal about the
conduct of the party in power. A public signal enables the
parties to sustain coordination themselves by using a
reciprocal strategy of some kind.233
Other models, however, do appear to presuppose
judicial supremacy, at least at first glance. In some cases,
the benefit associated with judicial power depends on the
certainty that a single voice provides.234 The presence of
multiple constitutional interpretations can interfere with
230. Id. (“[P]olitical parties cannot enforce mutual restraint on their own
because each party can never be sure that its opponent is cooperating and that
its opponent knows that it is cooperating.”).
231. See id. at 69.
232. Id. at 66.
233. For similar reasons, Ramseyer’s analysis, as well as a theory due to
William Landes and Richard Posner, do not presuppose judicial supremacy. See
generally Ramseyer, supra note 183 (developing a theory of judicial supremacy
based on future benefits to those currently in power); Landes & Posner, supra
note 183 (similar).
234. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 19, at 1371.
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the coordinating function ascribed to the courts. If there are
conflicting signals as to the constitutionality of government
action, then parties must somehow settle on one of those
signals to use in coordination. Others must be identified as
“interlopers.”235
We can see the effect of departmentalism on
coordination-based theories of judicial review by revisiting
David Law’s theory of judicial review, described briefly
above. Law is a majoritarian about judicial review. He
argues that judicial review enhances popular control over
political actors by solving the principal-agent problem that
affects all forms of representative constitutional
government.236 If people must act together to effectively
resist unconstitutional exercises of power, they need a
signal for their coordination. The signal shapes expectations
about how others will react. It ensures that, in Law’s
formulation, “everyone [] know[s] not only that the
[government] has misbehaved, but also that everyone
knows, and that everyone knows that everyone knows.”237
The people themselves are unable to directly monitor the
government because, in Law’s view, “[l]egal information is
not easy for ordinary people to obtain and absorb.”238 Even
assuming people possessed the requisite expertise, they
would be likely to disagree on a regular basis as to whether
there was, in fact, unconstitutional governmental action.239
Crucially, they would lack a basis for believing it common
knowledge
that
the
government
had
acted
unconstitutionally. The Supreme Court, however, can play
this role. Its decisions create a public signal of
constitutionality that all citizens expect to be treated as a

235. McAdams, Expressive Power of Adjudication, supra note 183, at 1058-59.
236. I omit for clarity Law’s second explanation of how the courts solve the
principal-agent problem: by providing the people with information about
governmental action. Law, supra note 183, at 731-32.
237. Id. at 742.
238. Id. at 743, 773.
239. Id. at 773.
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basis for action.240 In the language of game theory, the
Court’s views serve as a “focal point.”241
As Law points out, a focal point must be unique.242
Competing signals about the constitutionality of
government action defeat the purpose of generating a
shared expectation as to how others will act. It is here, of
course, that departmentalism would appear to run into
trouble; for it contemplates the publication of constitutional
interpretations by each branch as part of an ongoing process
of constitutional collaboration. No one participant in the
process enjoys a definitive or ultimate power of
interpretation. Suppose that Congress enacts a law and that
the president signs it, agreeing that it is constitutional; but,
sometime later, the Supreme Court refuses to enforce the
law, on the grounds that it exceeds Congress’s power under
the Constitution. Can the Court’s opinion generate common
knowledge among the people about how they will respond to
the continued enforcement of the law by the president?
Well, why not? As Law admits, there are, in any
democratic system of government, “a cacophony of
competing voices as to the constitutionality of government
conduct.”243 What privileges the voice of the Court, he says,
is that it comes from “an organ of government with various
trappings of authority and formal responsibility for
interpretation of the constitution.”244 In other words, it is the
Court’s publicly known positive status as the organ of
government charged with constitutional interpretation that
makes its opinion a focal point. Law draws an analogy to a
traffic intersection with a police officer and a number of
private interlopers, each attempting to direct traffic using
hand signals.245 “Only one of those people,” Law observes, “is

240. See id. at 770-71.
241. Id. at 771.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 774.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 775.
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wearing a dark blue uniform and a badge that reads ‘traffic
enforcement.’”246
But of course, there is nothing in in Article III that
bestows such an interpretative privilege on the Court. It has
no interpretative badge. Judicial supremacy is a political
artifact. As Whittington has shown, it was fought for—
sometimes by the Court, and sometimes by the president or
the Congress—and represents a particular point of
development in the political history of the United States.247
We also know that judicial supremacy was preceded by a
significant and widespread practice of popular enforcement
of the Constitution.248 And although our system today is
neither departmentalist nor (deeply) popular, there are,
under our current constitutional regime, spheres of
executive independence and judicial deference in
constitutional interpretation.249 In short, judicial supremacy
is an accidental feature of our constitutional regime.
Notably, nothing about this history violates formal theory.
As Law acknowledges, game theory allows for coordination
in the presence of multiple interpreters. Even if there were
two constitutional courts, he says, “a strategy of responding
only when both courts agree, and not when the courts send
contradictory signals” would likely be a focal point.250
Therein lies our solution. It bears repeating that Law’s
theory is meant to describe cases of mass resistance or
revolution, not ordinary political conduct.251 It seems likely
that treating the opinion of a single court as a focal point
will overpredict such forms of collective political action. The
246. Id.
247. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 12 (arguing that judicial
supremacy was a political accomplishment); Graber, Establishing Judicial
Review?, supra note 30 (similar).
248. See KRAMER, supra note 16, at 3-8. This is precisely the sort of
enforcement practice that Law imagines is necessarily impossible.
249. The political question doctrine is the leading example, but other
justiciability doctrines play a similar role. For the impact of political question on
presidential powers over foreign policy, see Adler, Foreign Policy, supra note
165, at 168-69.
250. Law, supra note 183, at 775-76.
251. See id. at 764-70.
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explanation has to be made to bear the weight of sustained
disagreement about the constitutionality of government
action, and to include the views of the people themselves,
who, contrary to Law’s supposition, are perfectly equipped
to form reasonable views about the meaning of the
Constitution. Imagine, then, that the people are constantly
receiving multiple, conflicting “official” signals about the
constitutionality of government action, as they would be
under moderate departmentalism. It would seem that the
following strategy would be focal: resist only if there is a
public, commonly persuasive view that the government has
exceeded its constitutional authority. Since most such views
are not commonly persuasive, we should expect widespread
resistance to be rare. Such resistance would occur when it
naturally would under a constitutional system: when there
is no reasonable question that the government has exceeded
its authority. Under this strategy, the more voices the
better, since each voice has the potential to expose
unconstitutional governmental action.
CONCLUSION
I have advanced two arguments in favor of moderate
departmentalism. First, moderate departmentalism is
collaborative, in the sense that it enhances the presidential
role in the dialogical process of constitutional
interpretation. The president’s meaningful participation in
this process gives him ownership over the resulting
constitutional rule, making it more likely that he will
comply with that rule. Second, under moderate
departmentalism there are strategic reasons, based in the
logic of repeat play, for the president to comply even with
facially unfriendly constitutional rules. These reasons
include avoiding the future costs of repeat litigation and
gaining the future benefits of being publicly seen to freely
adopt a rule announced by the Supreme Court. Taken
together, these arguments suggest that we should
reconsider the standard view of the relationship between
departmentalism and presidential control. There are
reasons to think that departmentalism promises not to
unbind the president from the fundamental law, but to
given him reason to bind himself to that law—a far more
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effective strategy for achieving compliance over the long
run.

